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Strange Bedfellows: The Federal
Constitution, Out-of-State Nongrantor
Accumulation Trusts, and the
Complete Avoidance of State Income
Taxation
Jeffrey Schoenblum*
With the maximum rate of federal income tax at 39.6 percent, the
Medicaresurtaxon investment income of 3.8 percent, and some state income tax
rates exceeding 9 percent, taxpayers in the highest brackets have been seeking
to develop strategies to lessen the tax burden. One strategy that has been
receiving increased attention is the use of a highly specialized trust known as
the NING, a Nevada incomplete gift nongrantor trust, which eliminates state
income taxation of investment income altogether without generatingadditional
federal income or transfer taxes. A major obstacle standing in the way of
accomplishing this objective, however, are the laws of a number of high-tax
states. These laws assert taxingjurisdictionover trusts created by grantors who
were resident in the state when the trust was created, even if the grantor has
long since departed the state or if the trust has been continuously administered
from out of state. Other high-tax states claim jurisdictionto tax the trust as long
as there is a beneficiary resident in the state at the time that the income is being
accumulated out-of-state or at the time a distributionis made. One state, New
York, simply outlaws the NING technique. In order to overcome these state laws,
tax planners have found an unlikely ally federal constitutional law. This
Article explores whether and how the FederalConstitution can be used to avoid
state income taxation. As it makes clear, interpretations of the Federal
Commerce and Due Process Clauses, though developed in other contexts, are
proving to be powerful tools in neutralizingstatejurisdictionto tax high-bracket

*
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appeared in a paper delivered at the 39th Annual Notre Dame Tax and Estate Planning Institute,
Oct. 18, 2013, entitled Dings, Nings, and Other Trusts for Reducing and EliminatingState Income
Tax and in an article, Jeffrey Schoenblum & Neil Schoenblum, Avoid State Income Taxes with the
Right Kind of Trusts, EST. PLAN., May 2014, at 19.

1945

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1946

[Vol. 67:6:1947

taxpayers with substantialinvestment income and an out-of-state trust such as
a NING.
I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION
................................
........ 1947
WHY A TRUST IS A POTENTIAL BREEDER OF MULTIPLE
STATE TAX LIABILITY
.................................
1954
STATE JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR TAXATION OF INTER
VIVOS IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS
..........................
1957

IV.

THE NING.......................................

V.

THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF

1963
CONSTITUTIONAL

CHALLENGES TO STATE TAX JURISDICTION ...
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF STATE INCOME
TAXATION OF TRUSTS
.................................

A.
B.

C.

VII.

...........

The Commerce Clause .................
......
The Due Process Clause.
......................
1.
The Quill Approach
...................
2.
The Greenough Approach
...............
3.
The Impact of the Testamentary
Trust Decisions
.......................
4.
The Due Process Clause and the "Forever
Tainted Trust" Jurisdiction Statutes ........
.....
The Pre-QuillDecisions.....
a.
b.
The Illinois Court of Appeals
Surrenders in Linn v. Department
of Revenue
.....................
...............
Constitutional
Issues
Lingering
1.
If Taxation of a Trust Hangs on Residence
of a Beneficiary, How Much Income Can
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..
Be Taxed?
2.
Can a Trust Be Taxed Based on the
Application of the Throwback Rule?.... . . . . . .
3.
Is New York's Statutory Classification of
Incomplete Gift Nongrantor Trusts as
Grantor Trusts Violative of the
.. .. .
U.S. Constitution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.
As a Constitutional Matter, Must One
State Facilitate the Enforcement of
Another State's Judgment Pertaining to
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .
State Income Tax?

CONCLUSION

........................................

1967
1969

1969
1975
1975
1976
1977
1981
1981

1985
1988

1988
1989

1993

1995
1997

2014]

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

1947

I. INTRODUCTION
Presently the maximum rate of federal taxation of taxable
income is 39.6 percent.1 With the Medicare surtax on investment
income of 3.8 percent, 2 the federal tax rate can exceed forty-three
percent. The state 3 tax in states such as California 4 and New York 5 can
easily exceed twelve percent. The combined federal-state share of
taxable income can, thus, be fifty-five percent or more.6 Even when a
state has a relatively benign rate of income taxation, a sale of a highly
appreciated asset can result in a significant state tax burden in absolute
dollars that is added to the federal tax due. 7
In light of the foregoing, it should come as no surprise that
taxpayers have been incentivized to pursue strategies that reduce or
eliminate the overall take of Government. For the individual with
investment income, one such option is the use of an out-of-state,
nongrantor accumulation trust that avoids all states' income taxes. In
particular, a Nevada Incomplete Gift Nongrantor Trust ("NING") has
recently received considerable attention and actually garnered IRS
approval.8

1.
I.R.C. § 1 (2012).
2.
Health and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L 111-152, § 1402, 124 Stat. 1029,
1060 (codified at I.R.C. § 1411).
3.
All references in this Article to the states include the District of Columbia.
4.
The maximum rate in California is 12.3 percent. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041
(West 2013); The Schools and Local Public Safety Protection Act of 2012 ("Proposition 30") (codified
at CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 36.), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ 2012/general/pdf/textproposed-laws-v2.pdfWnameddest prop30, archived at http://perma.cc/ W7GM-CM7F. In addition,
a one percent tax is imposed on taxable income in excess of $1 million. REV. & TAx. § 17043.
5.
The maximum rate of New York State tax is 8.82 percent. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 601(a)(1)(A) (McKinney 2013) (married individuals filing jointly and resident surviving spouse).
New York City imposes its own tax at a maximum marginal rate of 3.876%. See id. § 1304(b)(1)(a)
(married individuals filing jointly and resident surviving spouse). Thus, the combined rate of tax
could exceed twelve percent.
6.
The actual rate is effectively reduced somewhat to the extent that a deduction is claimed
at the federal level for state and local income taxes paid. See I.R.C. § 164(a)(3). However, for
purposes of the federal alternate minimum tax, state and local taxes are not permitted as a
deduction. See id. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii).
7.
Unlike federal tax law, even long-term capital gains are typically taxed at the same rate
as ordinary income under state tax laws.
8.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-10-002 (Mar. 8, 2013). See generally Robert Pagliarini,
Avoid State Income Tax with a Personal Tax Inversion, FORBES (July 31, 2014, 2:22 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpagliarini/2014/07/31/avoid-state-income-tax-with-a-personaltax-inversion/, archivedat, http://perma.cc/EGH3-VGAZ (explaining the mechanics of how various
out-of-state trusts avoid state income taxes); Richard Rubin, Wealthy New York Residents Escape
Tax with Trusts in Nevada, BLOOMBERG
Bus. WK. (Dec.
18, 2013),
http://
www.businessweek.com/news/2013-12-18-wealthy-n-dot-y-dot-residents-escape-levy-with-trustsin-Nevada-taxes, archived at http://perma.cc/K5CC-JCGV (explaining how residents of high
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The NING is designed to be an independent taxpayer for tax
purposes, separate and apart from the settlor. This is crucial, because
if the settlor retains certain strings of control, the trust is likely to be
regarded as a "grantor trust."9 In such case, the trust is ignored for
income tax purposes-the settlor1 0 is deemed still in effective control.
As a consequence, all income, even if accumulated in trust, will be
attributed to the settlor.
The grantor trust rules set forth in the Internal Revenue Code
have been, with just a few exceptions, enacted as part of state income
tax laws. Accordingly, there will be no state tax savings if the trust is
treated as a grantor trust. To avoid grantor trust status, the NING is
drafted so that strings of control, notably the power to make
distributions, are either held exclusively by beneficiaries with
substantial interests, such as members of settlor's family, or shared by
the settlor and these beneficiaries. These beneficiaries are deemed
"adverse parties" vis-A-vis the settlor under both the Code and state tax
laws that mirror the Code's grantor trust provisions. The assumption is
that adverse parties, being economically self-interested, will not
approve distributions to the settlor that have the effect of diminishing
their own interests in the trust." Because of these adverse interests,
the NING is a nongrantor trust rather than a grantor trust. On the
other hand, in reality, the settlor retains practical control in many of
these situations because adverse parties, especially younger family
members, are likely to comply with the perceived or stated wishes of the
settlor. 12
The nuanced drafting that avoids grantor trust status for income
tax purposes is not the end of the story. The settlor's retention of strings
of control may also impact the NING's treatment under the federal gift
tax. Indeed, a properly crafted NING is something of a sleight of hand,
a successful navigation of a Scylla and Charybdis of tax law-giving up
income-tax states use out-of-state trusts to avoid such taxes and those high income-tax states'
responses)
9.
See I.R.C. §§ 671-678.
10. The term "settlor" is used throughout this Article to refer to the person who creates the
trust by transferring assets to the trustee. The Code uses the term "grantor," which in most
respects is interchangeable with the term "settlor."
11.
See I.R.C. § 672(a), which provides in relevant part: "For purposes of this subpart, the
term 'adverse party' means any person having a substantial beneficial interest in the trust which
would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses
respecting the trust ..... Thus, an adverse party may also be another beneficiary of the trust other
than the settlor.
12. The reasons that they would be on board are numerous and may vary from one trust to
another. As an example, the settlor may have other wealth and the failure to cooperate may
jeopardize receipt of the other wealth by inheritance or otherwise. Alternatively, they may have
deep respect for a parent or grandparent settlor and willingly accede for that reason.
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sufficient strings of control so the settlor is not taxed on the income,
while not giving up too many strings of control so that the transfer of
assets to the trustee is a taxable transfer under the federal gift tax.
Fortunately, a tax arbitrage opportunity exists for sophisticated
planners. The federal income tax and the federal gift tax are not in pari
materia on the question of the quantum of control that results in a
transfer's being deemed complete or not. 13 The NING capitalizes on this
arbitrage opportunity by denying the settlor sufficient strings of control
so that the trust is a nongrantor trust for federal income tax purposes,
but preserves for the settlor certain strings of control that are only
pertinent to the federal gift tax. These strings of control make the
transfer incomplete and, thus, not a taxable gift for federal gift tax
purposes. 14
Even then, the NING is not for everyone. At the federal level,
the income taxation of a nongrantor accumulation trust is especially
punishing. For example, income earned in 2014 by such trusts is
subjected to the maximum 39.6 percent marginal rate of federal income
taxation once taxable income exceeds $12,150.15 By way of contrast,
assuming no trust, an individual taxpayer faces the maximum marginal
rate of taxation only for taxable income for the year in excess of
$406,750. Accordingly, the additional cost of using the trust when there
is at least $406,750 of taxable income is $41,283.35 for taxable years
beginning in 2014.16
But that additional federal tax cost might be worth incurring if
offset by even greater state income tax savings. In fact, under the proper
circumstances, such state income tax savings greatly outweigh the
additional federal tax cost. A simple example establishes this. Suppose
the state tax rate is a flat ten percent. Securities having a value of $20
million are transferred into trust. The securities produce annual net
income of eight percent, or $1.6 million. The tax each year would be
$160,000. This amount is nearly four times the additional tax cost,
$41,283.35, imposed under federal law for using a nongrantor
13. This lack of congruence between the federal income tax and federal gift tax has long been
recognized. See, e.g., Galtv. Comm'r, 216 F.2d 41, 44 (7th Cir. 1954); Farid-Es-Sultanehv. Comm'r,
160 F. 2d 812, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1947).
14. For a detailed discussion of the various types of strings of control that pass or do not pass
muster and other technicalities associated with the NING, see infra Part III.
15. See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. The rate schedule set forth in I.R.C. § 1(e) is
adjusted each year to take inflation into account. See I.R.C. § 1(f)(3).
16. In the case of a married couple filing jointly in 2014, the maximum rate comes into play
when taxable income exceeds $457,600. See I.R.C. § 1(a); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
As for the 3.8 percent Medicare surtax on investment income, it kicks in at two hundred thousand
dollars for a single taxpayer and two hundred fifty thousand dollars for joint filers. In other words,
it works off the unadjusted rate table in I.R.C. § 1 without any cost-of-living adjustment.
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accumulation trust. Even taking into account the administrative costs
associated with the trust, the savings are substantial and translate into
a meaningful increase in the net return on investment. Further, these
savings can be reinvested each year to produce additional income that
will not be subject to state tax either. Meanwhile, the federal tax cost of
using a nongrantor trust each year effectively remains static.
Alternatively, suppose the taxpayer in the hypothetical
transfers into trust the shares of a privately owned company, which
shares have a zero basis. When it goes public, the trust realizes $100
million in exchange for its shares. The taxpayer avoids a total of $10
million in state income taxes. As this example establishes, the
additional federal tax cost incurred in using the NING is insignificant
compared with the state tax savings that the NING delivers.
But the NING is not the only vehicle for attaining significant
state income tax savings. For example, assume that an individual
establishes a revocable trust during his lifetime. There are any number
of nontax reasons for doing so. 17 Since the settlor typically has a power
to revoke throughout the settlor's lifetime, the trust is deemed a grantor
trust for federal income tax purposes and trust income is reported as
part of the gross income of the settlor individually. 18 As noted, almost
all states adhere to these grantor trust rules and therefore will not
recognize the trust as a taxpayer separate from the settlor in this
situation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, upon the death of the settlor, the
revocable trust becomes irrevocable; that is, the trust becomes a
nongrantor trust, inasmuch as the settlor no longer exercises strings of
control. The trust is now the taxpayer, and if established and
administered in the settlor's home state, its investment income may
well be subjected to a high rate of taxation. By removing the trust to
another state, one that will not tax the trust's income, substantial
savings may be available, as demonstrated by the examples previously
discussed. 19 Moreover, in this case, the gift tax concerns that dog the
NING at its creation are not present. There is no gift during the settlor's
lifetime, as he or she maintained control. At the settlor's death,
however, the trust asset value is subjected to inclusion in the settlordecedent's gross estate. 20 Having incurred the transfer tax cost, the
focus can now be exclusively on reducing the state income tax cost.

17.

See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 465-69 (9th

ed. 2013).
18. See I.R.C. § 676.
19. See supra text accompanying note 16.
20. See I.R.C. § 2038.
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A second nongrantor trust situation would be one in which an
irrevocable trust was purposefully created, notwithstanding the taxable
gift involved. The typical goal here is to remove assets from the estate
early on and to transfer them to a separate taxpayer, the trust, before
the assets significantly appreciate and thereby generate a higher estate
tax at death than the gift tax the assets would have generated had they
been transferred during life. In this case, avoidance of the gift tax is not
a concern as in the case of the NING, since the goal is to complete the
gift. While this may, in fact, reduce the transfer tax burden, it does not
reduce the state income tax burden. Again, by situating the trust in an
appropriate state or moving to that state, state income taxes can be
eliminated altogether. 21
Regardless of whether a NING, a revocable trust turned
irrevocable accumulation trust, or another nongrantor accumulation
trust is involved, the fact that the trust has found a home in a state that
does not tax is not the end of the story. For example, the state in which
the settlor of the NING resides, or the state in which the settlor of a
revocable trust resided when he or she died and the trust became a
nongrantor trust, may seek to tax. But can the state do so?
At one level, the foregoing question can be answered by
consulting the relevant state statute that sets forth the state's taxing
jurisdiction. At another level of analysis, however, there is the question
of whether or not that state statute goes too far as a federal
constitutional matter. The principal concern of this Article is this
federal constitutional question and how it may facilitate the use of the
NING and other trusts to avoid all state income taxation on investment
income. Before delving into this question, the Article seeks to provide
the reader with the relevant foundation.

21.
But does nontax trust law permit an irrevocable trust established in one state to move
freely to another, more tax-favorable state? In fact, the Uniform Trust Code § 108(d) permits a
transfer without court approval, so long as "qualified beneficiaries" are notified and none object.
This is the case even if the purpose of the move is "to secure a lower state income tax rate." UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 108 cmt. (amended 2010). Other states have similar laws so that a solid majority
do not require judicial consent. Peter Gordon, Nonjudicial Transfer of Trust Situs Chart, ACTEC
(July 9, 2012) http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/Studies/GordonTransfer-of Situs and
GoverningLawJuly_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 37FU-DY4Q (the chart is an excellent
starting point, but the law in each state must be confirmed on an ongoing basis). Hawaii is one
state that requires such approval when there is no provision in the instrument and, very possibly,
even if there is such provision. See HAWAII REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:7-305 (LexisNexis 2014).
Note that the Uniform Trust Code actually imposes a duty on the trustee "to administer
the trust at a place appropriate to its purposes, its administration, and the interests of the
beneficiaries." This duty is "continuing." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 108(b). The comment accompanying
§ 108 recognizes that changing circumstances may require a move. Indeed, the trust will need a
specific provision to the contrary if the trustee is to be denied the power to move the principal place
of trust administration. Id. cmt.
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Part I of this Article explores how the structure and operation
of an out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust gives rise to contacts
with multiple states and how this, in turn, may afford a basis for more
than one state to tax the income of the trust. However, notwithstanding
this potential of an out-of-state trust to breed multiple-state taxation,
the reality is very different.
Indeed, Part II details the actual contacts that particular states
rely upon to delimit their taxing jurisdiction consistent with federal
constitutional requirements. In addition to organizing the states into
ten categories based on the contacts they rely upon for exercising tax
jurisdiction, this Part reveals a very critical conclusion that emerges
from a comprehensive study of the state tax laws: in most instances, the
states tend to delimit their taxing jurisdiction more than is
constitutionally required. This phenomenon opens the way for their
citizens to utilize out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trusts to avoid
home-state taxation of investment income entirely and to sidestep
taxation by other states as well.
But this is not true of all states. Part II reveals that several
categories of states, in a determined effort to preserve their tax base,
assert taxing jurisdiction rather aggressively. These states fall into two
principal categories-(i) those that continue to tax even long after the
settlor, beneficiaries, trustee, and assets have all departed the state;
and (ii) those that seek to reach the income of an out-of-state trust due
to the presence of resident beneficiaries at the time the income is earned
by the trust or eventually distributed to those beneficiaries. As shall be
seen, the federal constitutional validity of taxing based on these
attenuated contacts has been challenged in court, sometimes
successfully. Meanwhile, New York, arguably bypassing its own judicial
precedent, has recently declared a NING a grantor trust for state
income tax purposes at the very same time the Internal Revenue
Service has been issuing private letter rulings to the contrary. The
constitutionality of the New York statute is ripe for challenge.
Part III of the Article describes the basic design and operation
of the NING version of the out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust,
which is being utilized to avoid state income taxes altogether. This Part
also demonstrates how relatively uncomplicated it is for a nongrantor
accumulation trust to change its "home" and, in the process, to escape
another state's taxing jurisdiction.
Part IV of the Article hones in on an especially troubling
problem-the striking disparity in interpretation and application of
federal constitutional law with respect to the limits of state taxing
jurisdiction over out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trusts. It
identifies a largely ignored statute-the Tax Injunction Act-as the
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principal culprit. That statute essentially places exclusive jurisdiction
in the states to decide the scope of their taxing powers. In so doing, it
removes from federal courts the power to resolve conflicting state
determinations as to the extent of state taxing jurisdiction. Part IV
considers the extent to which this exclusion of federal courts has
produced disarray in the constitutional doctrine.
Building upon the first four parts of this article, Part V comes to
grips with the constitutional doctrine itself. In particular, consideration
is given to several critical state court decisions of quite recent vintage.
Tax avoiders using out-of-state trusts have succeeded in overturning
longstanding state tax jurisdiction statutes on Commerce Clause and
Due Process grounds. This Part of the Article analyzes in some detail
the constitutional arguments that have prevailed. These decisions,
however, have clustered around a certain set of facts. There remain
other circumstances that have received less thorough consideration and
remain open questions.
Part V, therefore, also considers how constitutional doctrine
should be applied in three situations that are currently being vigorously
disputed-(i) when the state taxes income on the basis that the settlor
was domiciled, or a resident there when the trust was created, or
became irrevocable; (ii) when the only contact with the state is that
there is a resident beneficiary; and (iii) when a statute, like the one in
New York, categorically reclassifies a NING or similar trust as a
grantor trust.
Part V of the Article also delves into the federal constitutional
limitations on the enforcement of one state's tax judgment in another
state. While the Full Faith and Credit Clause is often assumed to
require enforcement of other state judgments, there are limits. Thus,
even if a state has constitutionally sound taxing jurisdiction, it may find
itself severely hobbled in seeking to enforce a judgment against a trust
no longer resident in the state and without beneficiaries resident in or
valuable assets situated in the state.
Finally, Part V notes another critical contributor to the
constitutional disarray that exists-the failure of the U.S. Supreme
Court to resolve these issues. Indeed, the Court has not issued an
opinion bearing on the jurisdictional limits of state power to tax the
income of an out-of-state trust for more than seventy years.
The Article ends with the Conclusion. The Conclusion
summarizes the key points derived from the prior Parts and considers
in broader perspective the role that federal constitutional law plays. In
particular, the Federal Constitution's role is increasingly one of
facilitating the avoidance of all state income taxes via use of the out-ofstate nongrantor accumulation trust.
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II. WHY A TRUST IS A POTENTIAL BREEDER OF MULTIPLE STATE TAX
LIABILITY

A nongrantor trust created during the life of the settlor
invariably holds the potential to breed multiple state tax liabilities. A
simple example reveals why. Suppose a settlor creates a nongrantor
trust while domiciled in state A. He transfers publicly traded securities,
interests in mutual funds, and an art collection situated in state A into
trust. The trustee is a trust company with offices in state C, from which
it administers the trust. The beneficiaries are the settlor's spouse, who
also resides in state A, as well as his children and grandchildren, some
of whom are minors and reside with their parents at the situs of the
creation of the trust in state A. Other beneficiaries are scattered
throughout the United States, residing in states B, D, E, F, and G.
Based on the foregoing, there are as many as seven states-A,
B, C, D, E, F, and G-that can claim varying degrees of contact with the
trust. These contacts can be classified as residence of settlor, residence
of beneficiary, situs of assets, and situs of administration of the trust.
With respect to this last contact, if a trust is administered from state C,
but the trustee has its worldwide headquarters in state X, the trust's
tax residence is likely to be held to be the place from which the trust is
primarily administered during the taxable year and not the trustee's
worldwide headquarters.22
With respect to the settlor and the beneficiaries, what are their
"residences" for tax purposes? Often, albeit not always, the tax statute
will offer a definition comprised of two alternatives: (i) the traditional
concept of domicile, and (ii) statutory residence hinging on the number
of days during the year that the taxpayer was present in the state. The
satisfaction of either will result in classification as a resident.
A problem of multiple taxation can arise if two different states
determine that an individual is a tax resident. Especially since many
factors can enter into a determination of domicile, each state can decide
the individual is a domiciliary. Alternatively, one state may tax on the
basis of domicile and the other on the basis of physical residence in the
state for the requisite number of days during the year. As long as each
state has made a reasonable determination, each can tax on the basis
of residence status, notwithstanding the double taxation. In particular,

22.
But see N.Y. TAx LAW § 605(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2013), which treats a trust as
nonresident if all of the trustees are domiciled outside of New York.
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the Supreme Court has refused to intervene and resolve the conflicting
state determinations of tax residence. 23
The foregoing contacts may alter and may even extend to new
states over time. For example, suppose the settlor departs from state A
and settles in state H. Almost all of the art collection is removed from
state A to state H. The beneficiaries, especially as they attain
adulthood, scatter even further across the country. During this period
their stakes in the trust also change. Initially, some of the beneficiaries
were contingent or discretionary beneficiaries, but with the death of the
grantor's spouse, certain interests vest in the children-for example, a
mandatory share of annual net income followed by a principal
distribution at a specified age. 24
The changing array of state contacts detailed above, upon initial
consideration, ought to deter the less-than-committed client and his
planner from resorting to an out-of-state nongrantor accumulation
trust. There seem to be just too many contacts to avoid, and the risk of
multiple state taxation looms too large. Many of these contacts are
beyond the client's control, as they involve lifestyle decisions of other
family members, who may not be prepared to defer to the settlor.
Nevertheless, the considerable self-restraint shown by most states with
respect to the exercise of taxing jurisdiction, plus federal constitutional
doctrine, assures that concerns about multiple taxation can, in most
instances, be addressed successfully.
One potential fly in the ointment ought to be income derived
from intangible investment assets. As a federal constitutional matter,
more than one state can tax intangibles. This was the holding of the
Supreme Court in Curry v. McCanless, 25 which based its holding on the
fact that an intangible has no obvious and solitary situs. A state may
tax the intangible if it affords some benefit, protection, or power to a
person who has an economic interest in the intangible. At a bare
minimum, an intangible asset can, therefore, be taxed by the owner's
23. Although arising in the estate tax context, the language of the Court would seem to apply
as well to the income tax. See, e.g., Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 89 (1982) (stating that an earlier
decision, Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937), held that "there could be no
credible claim of a violation of federal law since it was clear from prior cases that inconsistent
determinations by the courts of two states as to the domicile of a taxpayer did not raise a
substantial federal constitutional question"); see also Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 659
N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 673 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that New York could
tax income from intangibles based on statutory residence, even though the owner of the intangibles
was actually domiciled in New Jersey).
24. The nature of the beneficiary's interest may prove critical for purposes of state income
tax jurisdiction. For example, California seeks to tax at least a portion of the income of an out-ofstate nongrantor accumulation trust that has a beneficiary resident in California but not if the
beneficiary's interest is contingent. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17742(a) (West 2013).
25. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 368-71 (1939).
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domicile. The benefits and protections afforded by the domicile state are
always deemed sufficient to justify the taxation of the owner.
Presumably other states, such as the state where the underlying entity
that has issued the intangible asset is organized, could also tax.
Curry v. MeCanless was a transfer tax case. 2 6 In the context of
state income tax, there has been an interesting and crucial
development-virtually every state now has a constitutional or
statutory provision that treats intangibles, at least in the income tax
setting, as situated exclusively at the owner's domicile or statutory
residence, except when used in a trade or business operating locally. 2 7
This assures that only one state will exercise taxing jurisdiction over
the income derived from the intangible investment asset, assuming no
dispute over domicile.
In the case of an out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust,
such as a NING, the ownership and strings of control over the
intangible investment assets are shifted to the trustee, who is a resident
of a state that does not tax the income from the assets. The ability to
change the situs of intangible investment assets by shifting ownership
to the trustee of an out-of-state trust is a central component of the tax
avoidance strategy considered in this Article.
In sharp contrast to investment income derived from
intangibles, constitutional principles have long confirmed that income
earned through the provision of services is taxable wherever it is
earned, that is, its source. The same is true for trade and business
income and rents and royalties from real property and tangible personal
property. 28 This does not mean that the state of actual domicile or
statutory residence of the owner is itself foreclosed from taxing such

26. Interestingly, the case involved a trust administered in Alabama. When the settlor, a
domiciliary of Tennessee, died, she exercised a general power of appointment that altered the
terms of the trust. Accordingly, Tennessee included the trust property subject to the power in her
estate. Alabama also taxed the property on the theory that it was being administered in an
Alabama trust at the time of her death. Id. at 361.
27.
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3 ("Moneys, credits, securities and other intangible
personal property within the state not employed in carrying on any business therein by the owner
shall be deemed to be located at the domicile of the owner for purposes of taxation . . .
28. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 53 (1920):
[T]he very fact that a citizen of one state has the right to hold property or carry on an
occupation or business in another is a very reasonable ground for subjecting such
nonresident, although not personally, yet to the extent of his property held, or his
occupation or business carried on therein, to a duty to pay taxes not more onerous in
effect than those imposed under like circumstances upon citizens of the latter state.;
see also Zelinskyv. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that New York
could tax the compensation of a law professor who lived in Connecticut but taught in New York,
as long as the tax was fairly apportioned based on days worked in the state during the tax year).
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income as well. 29 The risk of multiple state taxation looms large.
However, this problem of multiple taxation is averted in the case of
income derived from intangible investment assets.
III. STATE JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR TAXATION OF INTER VIVOS
IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS
As a by-product of federalism, 30 each state is able to design its
own tax laws, to determine the extent of its own taxing jurisdiction, and
to compete for capital from other states. 31 Consequently, there is
considerable variety in state tax laws. This patchwork of rules rewards
the opportunistic states, as well as the individuals who choose to shift
the situs of ownership of their capital to such states via the trust
vehicle.
As has already been discussed, a trust may have substantial
contacts with any number of states. 32 Nevertheless, many states have
chosen to delimit their own taxing jurisdiction to well within
constitutional confines, thereby encouraging efforts to avoid the state's
tax through a variety of techniques such as the use of an out-of-state
nongrantor accumulation trust. For the citizens of most states, then,
tax avoidance with respect to investment income through the use of the
out-of-state accumulation trust mechanism is easily achievable. The
following analysis demonstrates this proposition.
1. No tax under any circumstances: Alaska, Florida, Nevada,
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. There is no reason to
use an out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust since no tax is
imposed on residents of these states.

2. No tax as long as there is no resident trustee and/or no trust
administrationin the state: Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, 33

29. See, e.g., Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937) (holding New York could tax the rental
income of a New York resident derived from New Jersey realty); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n,
286 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1932). Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court earlier this year in a
case that raises the issue whether the county of residence must afford a credit for taxes imposed
by the source state under constitutional principles, especially the Commerce Clause. See Md. State
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453 (Md. Ct. App. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
2660 (May 27, 2014) (No. 13-485).
30. For an excellent discussion of federalism values inherent in state autonomy and
competition with respect to taxation, see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the
Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1294-1305 (2013).
31. See Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 50.
32. See supra Part II.
33. Iowa's law is a bit more intricate. See IOWA ADM. CODE r.701-89.3 (2014). The tax can be
sidestepped if the trustee is not resident in the state, the trust is not being administered in the
state, and evidence of ownership of intangibles is not kept in the state.
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Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New Jersey, 34
Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah. In these states, an out-of-state
nongrantor accumulation trust thus readily avoids home-state tax on
investment income.

3. No tax as long as there is no resident trustee and/or no trust
administrationin the state. However, this is true only if state law is not
designated by the trust instrument as the governing law: Louisiana.
4. No tax if there is no administrationof the trust in the state,
and there is no real or tangible personal property situated in state:
Idaho. 35

5. No tax, as long as a beneficiary is not resident in the state:
Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, 36 North Carolina, 37 Rhode
Island, 38 and Tennessee. 39 Accordingly, there is no need for an out-ofstate nongrantor accumulation trust, assuming no resident beneficiary.
Who is a "resident" beneficiary? In Delaware, a beneficiary would have
to maintain a place of abode in the state and also spend more than 183
days in the state during the taxable year. 40 Needless to say, in a year in
which accumulated income is being distributed, one who is otherwise a
resident beneficiary could avoid presence in the state for a sufficient
34. Based on judicial decisions overturning the controlling statute. See Residuary Trust Av.
Dir., Div. of Taxation, 27 N.J. Tax 68, 75-76 (2013).
35. Idaho actually has a multi-factor trust. The trust is a resident if three of the following
factors are present: domicile or residence of the grantor; Idaho governing law is designated for the
trust; trust property with a situs in the state; domicile or residence of the trustee in the state; and
administration of the trust in the state. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 35.01.01.035 (2014) There is no
clear indication that the grantor and the trustee have to be domiciled or resident in Idaho, for
example, when the trust is created or in the taxable year. See id.
36. The tax is limited to dividend and interest income. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:10
(2014).
37. The North Carolina statute is currently under constitutional challenge. See LEGISLATIVE
COMM. OF THE ESTATE PLANNING AND FIDUCIARY LAW SECTION OF THE NCBA, MEMORANDUM TO

REVENUE LAWS STUDY COMM. (2014). The case is Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust v.
North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, pending in the Business Court of North Carolina. See No. 12
CVS 8740, 2013 WL 512613 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2013). The Memorandum states that the law
"is largely ignored by out-of-state trustees and is virtually impossible to enforce." LEGISLATIVE
COMM., supra § 8(d).
38. Residency of the beneficiary is determined at the close of the trust's taxable year. If
income is being accumulated for a group of beneficiaries, the trust is resident if anyone is a resident
beneficiary, to the extent of "accumulated income pertaining to the resident beneficiary or
beneficiaries." 46-050 R.I. CODE R. § 010 (2014). How this is to be determined is set forth in a series
of examples that need to be carefully considered in drafting a trust that will have a Rhode Island
beneficiary. In addition there is a throwback rule. Id.
39. The tax is imposed only on dividends from stock and interest from bonds. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-2-102 (2014).
40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1103(2) (2014). If the beneficiary of a resident trust is a
nonresident, income distributed to such beneficiary or set aside for future distribution to the
beneficiary is deductible from what would otherwise be the taxable income of the trust. See id.
§§ 1635(a)-1636.
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number of days to avoid that status. Of course, most beneficiaries will
not be residents of the state in any event, so that, effectively, Delaware
will not tax trust income.

6. No tax, as long as a beneficiary is not a resident of the state,
and there is no resident trustee or trust administration in the state:
California 4 1 and North Dakota. 42 Accordingly, an out-of-state
nongrantor accumulation trust generally works, subject to the caveat
regarding a resident beneficiary. As a practical matter, the concern
about resident beneficiaries may not be all that troublesome. First,
under California law, the tax is not imposed, even if the beneficiaries
are resident, if they are "contingent beneficiaries." 43 A discretionary
interest in a trust would constitute a contingent interest and not be
taxable as long as there was no actual distribution.4 4 Making beneficial
interests discretionary is common in trust drafting and often highly
desirable entirely apart from income tax planning.4 5
However, upon receipt of a distribution, the beneficiary will be
taxed if resident in California during the year. There are two critical
provisions that make tax avoidance more difficult. First, residence is
presumed if the person is a resident of California during accumulation,
leaves the state within twelve months of the distribution, and returns
within twelve months of the distribution.4 6 This makes it considerably
more difficult to dodge the California tax by timing one's presence in
the state during the year of distribution, as is possible in Delaware.
Second, California enforces a throwback rule with respect to outof-state trusts.4 7 A throwback rule works by altering normal trust
accounting. Ordinarily, a beneficiary is taxed for the current year on
41.
In the case of a corporate trustee, residence is where the major portion of the
administration of the particular trust takes place. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17742(b) (West
2013).
42. Also, North Dakota law must not be the designated governing law and there must not be
trust assets with a situs in North Dakota. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-03-02.1-04(2) (2014).
43. See CAL. REV. & TAx § 17742(a).
44. See, e.g., Cal. Franchise Tax Board Tech. Adv. Memo. 2006-0002 (Feb. 17, 2006). See
generally CAL. REV. & TAX § 17745(b). If no taxes have been paid on the current or accumulated
income of the trust because the resident beneficiary's interest in the trust was contingent, such
income shall be taxable to the beneficiary when distributed or distributable to him or her.
45.
The reasons for doing so is to assure that creditors of the beneficiary cannot reach the
assets and to control distributions to a beneficiary based on demonstrated maturity and ability to
act responsibly over time. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 17, at 9-10, 688-94.
46. See CAL. REV. & TAx § 17745(e).
47.
The source of the rule is I.R.C. § 667 (2012), which no longer applies with respect to
domestic trusts. The throwback rule set forth in the Internal Revenue Code was designed to
eliminate the benefit of accumulations in trust when the rate of taxation imposed on a trust was
less onerous than on individuals. In contrast, the throwback rule is used by California to tax
income accumulated out-of-state and not taxed there or not taxed as much once it is brought back
into the state for the benefit of a resident Californian.
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the net income deemed distributed to the beneficiary.4 8 If the
beneficiary receives a distribution in excess of the trust's net income,
then the rest of the distribution is considered to be principal and not
subject to income taxation. The California throwback rule changes this.
It treats the "principal" portion of the distribution as first constituting
income accumulated in prior years in the out-of-state accumulation
trust, where it went untaxed.
In applying the throwback rule, accumulations for the five
preceding years can be considered. They will be taxed as if received
ratably over the five-year-or-shorter accumulation period, but there is
no interest charged for the theoretical late payment.4 9 One offsetting
benefit is that tax liability is prorated based on the relative amount of
net income eventually to be distributed to the resident beneficiaries. 50
This is a rather ambiguous measure. However, in a quite typical case of
equal shares, it may avoid considerable taxes. For example, if only one
of four equal income beneficiaries is resident in California at the time
of the distribution, then only one-fourth of the income is subject to
income taxation upon distribution to the four beneficiaries.

7. No tax as long as the settlor of the trust was not domiciled or
resident in the state at time the trust became irrevocable and no
beneficiary is domiciled in the state in the current tax year: Alabama,5 1
Missouri, 52 and Ohio. Inasmuch as the first requirement could not likely
be avoided, the second is crucial. Essentially, the same beneficiary
issues discussed in categories 5 and 6 would have to be confronted.

8. No tax as long as the settlor of the trust did not have a domicile
and/or residence in the state either at the time the trust became
irrevocable due to death of the settlor or otherwise, or at the time
additional property was donated to the irrevocable trust: Arkansas,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine, MassachusettS 53, Minnesota,

48. Meanwhile the trust is allowed to deduct the amount of net income distributed. This
assures that the trust and the beneficiary are not taxed on the same net income.
49. See CAL. REV. & TAx § 17745(e).
50.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit., 18

§ 17744

(2014).

51. Even if there is no resident beneficiary, a resident trustee can trigger the tax if the other
contacts have been satisfied. See ALA. CODE § 40-18-1(33) (2014).
52. Missouri determines residence based on the beneficiary's residence on the last day of the
taxable year, opening up a number of planning possibilities. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.331(2)(b) &
(3)(b) (West 2014) (defining a resident trust).
53.
Massachusetts has an especially expansive statute. The trust is also taxed if the settlor
is an inhabitant of the state during the taxable year or died an inhabitant of the state, or if a
trustee is an inhabitant of the state. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62, § 10(c) (West 2014).
"Inhabitant" basically means permanent resident. Id. ch. 62, § 1(f).
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Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont,5 4 Virginia,55 West Virginia,5 6 and
Wisconsin.
This requirement is the most difficult to avoid. Essentially, the
trust is "forever tainted" if the settlor was domiciled/resident at the time
it became a nongrantor trust. Even if there are no resident
beneficiaries, trustees, or assets in the state and the settlor himself or
herself has long since departed from the state, the tax will continue to
be imposed and efforts will be made by the state to collect it.
The harshness of this jurisdictional standard has stimulated a
spate of recent and not-so-recent cases challenging its constitutionality
under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal
Constitution. Indeed, Illinois's law recently has been held
unconstitutional.5 7 The same is true of similar laws in Michigan5 8 and
Pennsylvania.5 9 In each of these states, however, no substitute
jurisdiction statute has been enacted, thus leaving the jurisdictional
bases for taxing a nongrantor accumulation trust administered out-ofstate entirely unresolved. This uncertainty regarding whether there are
valid jurisdictional contacts for imposing tax (and, if so, what they are)
prevents taxpayers with existing trusts from making enforceable claims
for refunds for taxes paid based on unconstitutional grounds in prior
years.

54. The Instructions to FI-161 indicate that a trust is also taxable as a resident trust, even
if it previously became irrevocable in another state, if the settlor was a resident of Vermont at the
time of his death. See VERMONT FIDUCIARY RETURN OF INCOME (2013), available at
http://www.state.vt.us/tax/pdf.word.excel/forms/income/2013/2013FI-161-fillin.pdf,
archived at
http://perma.cc/KCW7-6W78 ("Resident Estate means the estate of a decedent who was domiciled
in Vermont at the time of death."). The statute indicates, however, that the trust would have to
become irrevocable on account of the settlor's death. See VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 32 § 5811(11)(B) (2013)
(stating when a trust qualifies for residency in Vermont).
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-302 (2014) provides for taxation of a trust created with property
"of a person domiciled in the Commonwealth" but, unlike some other states, does not appear to
require domicile at the time of creation. Thus, a person who moves to Virginia after creating a
trust could be subject to tax since it would then consist of property of a domiciliary. On the other
hand, when the person changes domicile from Virginia to another state the tax would cease. The
trust is also subject to tax if being administered in Virginia. See 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 10-11510(2) (2014).
56. The language used is similar to Virginia's in its ambiguity, see supra note 55, as to when
the settlor has to be domiciled in the state in order for the tax to be imposed.
57. See Linn v. Dep't of Revenue, 2 N.E.3d 1203, 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (holding
unconstitutional the taxation of a trust with no contacts to the state of Illinois).
58. See Blue v. Dep't of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764-65 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (declaring
imposition of a state tax on a trust without minimum contacts to the state to be a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
59. See Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust ex rel. McNeil v. Commonwealth, 67 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2013) (determining that a Pennsylvania tax on certain trusts violated the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution).

1962

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:6:1947

9. No tax as long as the settlor is not a resident during the current
taxable year: Maryland.6 0 If the settlor is not prepared to change
"residence," then he or she will face considerable difficulty in avoiding
tax, much as in the case of a settlor in a category 8 state. However, the
Maryland tax-jurisdiction statute is both more and less expansive. A
settlor who creates a trust while resident in Maryland, but then leaves
the state, would not continue to be subject to tax. Nor would the trust.
On the other hand, the income of the trust would be subject to tax in
the case of a person who was not resident when the trust was
established but is resident in a year in which the trust has investment
income, even though the trust was administered out of state and
without resident beneficiaries.

10. The NING is treated as a grantor trust, despite being
classified as a nongrantortrust for federal tax purposes: New York. 61 By
categorizing the NING as a grantor trust, New York has eliminated its
utility as a tax-avoidance technique. 62 This dramatic measure, taken in
response to rising concerns about the impact it could have on revenues,
was not the only attack on out-of-state trusts. New York has also now
introduced a throwback rule, largely modeled on California's law, 63
when a distribution is made to a New York resident beneficiary. Prior
to these changes, nongrantor accumulation trusts could successfully
avoid New York taxation if the trustee was not domiciled in the state,
there were no assets of the trust in the state, and all income and gains
were derived from or connected with sources outside the state, which
would include intangible investment assets held in the trust.6 4
Based on the foregoing analysis, it should come as no surprise
that the most controversial statutes, constitutionally speaking, are (i)
those that allow taxation even though all contacts with the state have
60. See MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 10-101(k)(1)(iii)(2) (LexisNexis 2014) (declaring
fiduciary of a trust as a resident if "the creator or grantor of the trust is a current resident" of
Maryland). Thus, it is possible to avoid the tax after trust creation by the settlor changing state
residence. However, if the trust is administered in Maryland, it will be subject to tax. See id.
§ 101(k)(1)(iii)(3) (stating a fiduciary of a trust is a "resident," thus subject to state tax, if the trust
is primarily administered by the state). As for residence, a change could prove difficult, since it
would exist if the settlor is domiciled there on the last day of the year or maintained a place of
abode for more than six months during the year. See id. § 10-101(k)(1)(i) (defining residency for an
individual).
61. See N.Y. TAx LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2013) (accounting for income from an
"incomplete gift non-grantor trust"-a NING-in the same manner "as a grantor trust for federal
tax purposes").
62.
See id. § 612(b) (adding income from an "incomplete gift non-grantor trust" to the
calculation of "federal adjusted gross income" for taxing purposes); infra Part VI.C.3.
63.
See N.Y. TAx LAW § 612(b)(40).
64. See id §605(b)(3)(D) (providing the conditions under which a resident trust is not subject
to taxation).
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since terminated, followed by (ii) those statutes that base taxation on
the residence of a beneficiary in the state in the year of receipt by the
trustee or year of distribution by the trustee to the beneficiary, and
finally, (iii) the New York legislation, highlighted in category 10 above.

IV. THE NING
Estate planners and other tax advisors relentlessly seek to
develop and employ techniques that allow the client and his or her
successors in interest to maximize returns on investment by reducing
the cost of taxes. Even a 0.5 percent increase in return on an annual
basis, compounded yearly and perpetually free of state tax, is
significant. This is precisely what the NING is designed to accomplish.6 5
The NING is created in a nontax state and then is administered by a
trustee there who has no connections with the taxing home state. The
settlor escapes taxation by the home state, inasmuch as the settlor no
longer owns the assets that produce the taxable income. Meanwhile, the
new owner-the trust-also escapes taxation at its home.66
The NING is designed to insulate from all state income taxation
investment income derived from intangible assets such as securities. It
cannot accomplish the same with respect to income from tangible
assets, such as rental income, or gains from the disposition of real estate
or tangible personal property, such as works of art. Income from
tangible property can be taxed at the situs of the property.6 7
But why does an incomplete gift nongrantor trust have to be
established in Nevada, ergo, the NING? While there are any number of
states, in addition to Nevada, that do not impose a state income tax, 68
65.
See Neil Schoenblum & Jeffrey Schoenblum, Dings, Nings, and Other Trusts for
Reducing and Eliminating State Income Tax, 39th Annual Notre Dame Tax and Estate Planning
Institute 24-1, 24-3 to 24-4 (Oct. 18, 2013).
66. Under the laws of states that impose an income tax, a trust is typically regarded as an
entity, capable of having its own tax residence, just as under federal tax law. In contrast, under
classical nontax, state-trust common law, the trust is not a distinct entity. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) TRUSTS § 2 (2003) (defining a trust as a "fiduciary relationship" between a person and
property).
67. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363 (1939):
That rights in tangibles-land and chattels-are to be regarded in many respects as
localized at the place where the tangible itself is located for purposes of the jurisdiction
of a court to make disposition of putative rights in them, for purposes of conflict of laws,
and for purposes of taxation, is a doctrine generally accepted.
One possible solution with respect to an asset like real estate, which cannot be moved, is to convert
it to intangible property by placing ownership in an entity, such as a limited liability company,
that is organized outside of the state, possibly in Nevada as well. However, there are a number of
non-income-tax reasons why this may prove unfeasible.
68. See supra Part 11.1.
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they are not suitable. The reason is that they do not have an appropriate
asset protection trust statute.
The conundrum for the settlor of the NING is that he or she not
only wants to avoid all state income taxes but also wants to retain some
access to the trust estate during the trust's existence. In other words,
the NING is not designed to constitute a complete transfer involving a
total relinquishment of the settlor's interest. Basically the settlor wants
to have his cake and eat it too. The problem with retaining this interest
in the trust is that under the common law of trusts, as well as under
the Uniform Trust Code 69 now adopted by more than one-half of the
states,7 0 creditors of the settlor can reach trust assets if the settlor
retains access to the trust estate. Even if the settlor is only a
discretionary beneficiary, the creditors of the settlor can reach the
maximum that the trustee is empowered to distribute to the settlor in
the exercise of the trustee's discretion, whether or not a distribution is
actually made.7 1 The fact that creditors of the settlor can reach the trust
estate is considered an economic benefit to the settlor, since the settlor's
individual liabilities can be satisfied and the settlor thereby has more
resources available to him.
Under the grantor trust rules of the Internal Revenue Code, 72
the possibility that trust assets can be accessed to cover claims of
creditors of the settlor make the trust a "grantor trust," that is, one
deemed owned by the settlor. The income of a grantor trust is included
in the income of the settlor for the taxable year. Since almost all states
follow the grantor trust rules, 7 3 a trust that is a grantor trust for federal
purposes will also be one for state-law purposes. Thus, the trust's
income will be deemed the settlor's individual income and will be
taxable based on his residence in the state.
How, then, can the settlor avoid the grantor trust rules? One
obvious way is to retain absolutely no rights or powers with respect to
the trust. In that case, the settlor's current or future creditors could not
reach the assets of the trust. The problem with this approach is that the
69. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) (amended 2010), available at http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trust-code/utcfinal-rev2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
S6G7-NMGM (stating creditors have the ability to access "the maximum amount that can be
distributed to or for the settlor's benefit" from a trust).
70. See Enactment Status Map, UNIF. LAWS COMM'N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspxtitle=Trust%20Code, archived at http://perma.cc/RRU7-37C4?type source (last visited
July 28, 2014) (visual denotation of which states have enacted the Uniform Trust Code).
71.
See Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 52 n.3 (Ill. 2012) ("This rule has a
500-year lineage.").
72.
I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (2012).
73.
However, there are certain states that do not do so. These would include D.C.,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. See Schoenblum & Schoenblum, supra note 65, at 24-37.
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settlor views the NING as an income tax play. The settlor actually is
not prepared to give up all access to the assets in trust or their income.
At a minimum, the settlor will seek to retain an interest in income
and/or principal as a discretionary beneficiary. In order to retain this
interest and still not have the trust classified as a grantor trust, the
settlor must identify a state that allows settlors to retain such interest
without access being granted to their future or hypothetical creditors.
This would be a dramatic deviation from the common law and the
Uniform Trust Code. 74
Nevada presently is the one state that affords a reliable solution.
Its statute bars claims of all creditors, including those claiming spousal
maintenance or support, alimony, and child support. That is not to say
that other states do not also afford asset protection through special
trust legislation. There are actually an increasing number of such
states. 75 However, these states' statutes do not exclude all claims,
notably those for child support. 76 For this very reason, there is some
doubt whether the Delaware alternative to the NING, appropriately
named the DING, can assure nongrantor trust status for federal and
state income tax purposes.
But even with respect to the NING, there is another problem.
Recall that the NING is a vehicle used to avoid state income tax. The
problem is that the very transfer of investment assets by the settlor to
the NING trustee could result in a federal taxable gift. 77 That does not
mean necessarily that federal gift tax will be due. There is a combined
gift and death transfer exclusion equal to $5.34 million in 2014.78 This
amount is also protective of generation-skipping transfers.7 9 The
settlor, in creating the NING, does not intend to exhaust this transfer
tax exclusion-that would simply offset the benefit of the NING,
especially since those using NINGs are likely to have transfer tax
74. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note
17, at 703.
75.
These include Nevada, South Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Alaska, Wyoming, Delaware,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, Mississippi (effective July 1,
2014), and Oklahoma. These fifteen states are evaluated in Steve Oshins, 5th Annual Domestic
Asset
Protection
Trust
States
Rankings
Chart
(August
2014),
http://
www.oshins.com/images/DAPTRankings.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4H6H-QXNF.
76. See Schoenblum & Schoenblum, supra note 65, at 24-55.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
78. See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Section 3.32 provides: "For an estate of any
decedent dying during calendar year 2014, the basic exclusion amount is $5,340,000 for
determining the amount of the unified credit against estate tax under § 2010.").
79. See I.R.C. § 2631(c) (2012) (stating the exemption amount for a GST-generationskipping transfer). Unlike the estate tax and gift tax applicable exclusion amounts, the GST
exemption amount applied to particular assets expands with the value of those assets and in that
respect over time can exempt value greatly in excess of the amount originally claimed.
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exposure at some point and will need to use the exclusion. Moreover,
the amounts involved in a transfer may exceed the $5.34 million
exclusion, or whatever portion of the exclusion still remains after the
taxpayer's prior taxable gifts. Thus, the transfer of intangible
investment assets to the NING might generate an actual liability to pay
gift tax. This is a highly undesirable result from the standpoint of the
settlor, who has turned to the NING in order to save taxes, not to
generate them.
Avoiding federal gift tax is easy. The settlor could retain a host
of controls that would make the transfer incomplete. The problem is
retaining such controls while still making the transfer complete for
income tax purposes, so that the trust is not a grantor trust and the
trust's income is not imputed to the settlor. Here, federal tax law
provides a pathway, accounting for the introduction of a number of
highly nuanced permutations into the trust. Precisely because the
federal gift tax law and federal income tax law are not in pari materia
when it comes to the question of the settlor's retained control, the
possibility exists of the trust being complete for income tax purposes
and incomplete for gift tax purposes-an ideal result from the
standpoint of the settlor and a disaster from the standpoint of state
taxing authorities.
This design ordinarily results in a structure where one or more
committees, of which the settlor is a member, determine distributions.
The other committee members may be family members who are also
beneficiaries. Rather than being regarded as pawns of the settlor, these
beneficiaries are deemed adverse precisely because they are
beneficiaries and would have their own interests diminished by
approving a distribution to the settlor. After years of uncertainty,8 0 the
IRS has recently issued several private letter rulings concluding that
the creation of the NING, if properly designed, is a complete transfer
for income tax purposes, and that the NING thereby avoids grantor
trust status. On the other hand, the transfer into trust is incomplete for
gift tax purposes, and therefore incurs no offsetting transfer tax cost.
But for this best-of-both-worlds series of private letter rulings by the

80. Initially, the IRS ruled favorably on DINGS, that is, incomplete gift nongrantor trusts
administered in Delaware. See Jeffrey Schoenblum & Neil Schoenblum, Avoid State Income Tax
with the Right Kind of Trusts, EST. PLAN., May 2014, at 29-30.
(noting the routine approval of DINGS in the past). Then, in I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-127
(July 9, 2007), the Service called into question its own analysis. The release sought comments, and
the Service received many. Nevertheless, no further ruling, opinion, or comment was issued for
approximately five years thereafter, thus effectively terminating the use of this sort of trust except
for those with no risk aversion. Schoenblum & Schoenblum, supra, at 30. Further concerns were
raised with the issuance of I.R.S. CCA 201208026 (Feb. 24, 2012).
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IRS, the NING would be quickly removed from the sophisticated estate
planner's toolkit and fade into oblivion.8 1
Finally, regardless of whether it is a NING or other irrevocable
trust, the out-of-state trust must be an accumulation trust. In other
words, the trustee principally must retain the earned investment
income in the trust, rather than distributing it to beneficiaries. While
there may be distributions planned for years down the road, or perhaps
as a result of emergency needs, routine distributions would undermine
the tax benefits of the trust. The reason is that if the beneficiary is in a
state that taxes income, the receipt by the beneficiary will almost
certainly be deemed income and will be taxed. As such, routine
distributions, rather than accumulations, will simply shift the incidence
of taxation from the trust to the beneficiaries and will generally not
eliminate all state income taxes. Accordingly, there is no point in
resorting to a NING if the settlor intends to make routine distributions.
Likewise, there is no point in transferring the principal place of
administration of a more traditional irrevocable trust to a nontax state
if routine distributions are likely to be made to a beneficiary residing in
a state that taxes income. 82
V. THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
STATE TAX JURISDICTION

As has already been discussed in Part II, there are important
federal constitutional law questions regarding the contacts relied on by
some states to justify taxing out-of-state nongrantor accumulation
trusts. Critically, these questions will almost certainly not be resolved
in the federal courts. These matters, in fact, have been reserved
exclusively to the state courts.
The controlling statute disabling federal court jurisdiction is the
Tax Injunction Act. 83 It provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
81.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 2013-10-002 to 2013-10-006 (Mar. 8, 2013) (determining that
transfer to a NING trust is an incomplete gift and that a NING is not a grantor trust). These
rulings were followed by I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 2014-10-001 to 2014-10-010 (Mar. 7, 2014) (holding
that distribution committees could be comprised of minor children represented by their guardians,
without undermining the status of the NING).
82.
Note that the jurisdiction to tax a resident beneficiary as an individual is quite distinct
from the jurisdiction to tax the out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust based on the residence
of a beneficiary in the taxing state. The latter is subject to serious constitutional concerns. See
supra Part 11.5-7 and infra Part V.C.1.
83.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (setting broad limits on district court jurisdiction over
matters of tax collection and assessment).
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courts of such State."8 4 In large part, the statute was enacted to prevent
federal courts from intervening in a vital function of the states: the
raising of revenue through taxation. 85 Thus, as long as the state affords
an adequate remedy for a taxpayer to challenge an assessment, levy, or
collection of tax by the state, the Tax Injunction Act proscribes federal
court jurisdiction.8 6
All such decisions by state courts are reviewable by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Certainly, the Supreme Court has granted petitions for
certiorari and issued opinions regarding the power of states to tax
interstate and international business profits under the Commerce and
Due Process Clauses. Nonetheless, the facts and circumstances of those
cases, typically involving business activity, do not closely match those
involving the taxation by one state of an out-of-state trust that earns
passive income on investment assets. The jurisprudential task of
determining which contacts with a state suffice to justify taxation has
been made more difficult by the failure of the Supreme Court to consider
the constitutional aspects of taxing out-of-state trusts for more than
seventy years.
What are the implications of the Tax Injunction Act in terms of
the development of a coherent constitutional jurisprudence regarding
the power of a state to tax an out-of-state trust, its settlor, or its
beneficiaries? One might have expected that constitutional arguments
denying a state's power to tax would receive a hostile reception in that
state's courts. Indeed, there has been a checkered history, with courts
in certain, traditionally high-tax states, rejecting federal constitutional
arguments that would deny the state the jurisdiction to tax out-of-state
trusts linked to an in-state settlor or beneficiaries. More recently,
however, several state courts have risen remarkably above provincial

84.

Id.

85. See Peter Enrich, Federal Courts and State Taxes: Some JurisdictionalIssues, with
Special Attention to the Tax InjunctionAct, 65 TAx LAW. 731, 744 (2012) (explaining that the Tax
Injunction Act was grounded on the imperative of limiting federal court jurisdiction over the local
concern of tax collection).
86. A second purpose for enactment of the law was to put local taxpayers on a par with outof-state taxpayers who, but for the Tax Injunction Act, might be able to rely on federal diversity
jurisdiction when injunctive relief is sought. See id. at 743-44 (noting that large intrastate
businesses, prior to the Act, frequently used federal courts to enjoin the collection of local taxes).
While there would be diversity jurisdiction, but for the Tax Injunction Act, in the case of local
taxes, there would typically not be jurisdiction in the case of state taxes, as a state cannot be a
citizen of a state. See id. at 736 (explaining the potential unavailability of diversity jurisdiction for
state tax actions). Arguably, however, if diversity is based on the citizenship of a state officer, the
requirements for diversity of citizenship could be satisfied. See id. at 735-36 ("[T]he state generally
is not considered the party in interest in cases seeking injunctive relief against a state officer so
diversity jurisdiction arguably may be appropriate in such cases."); see also Ex parte Young, 299
U.S. 123, 184-85 (1908) (the state officer is the real party in interest).
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interests and held their own state revenue authorities' attempts to tax
out-of-state trusts violative of the Federal Constitution. Indeed, in the
past two years, important decisions in Illinois and Pennsylvania have
confirmed a strong trend to rule, on Commerce Clause and Due Process
grounds, against longstanding statutes authorizing expansive exercise
of state jurisdiction to tax. The Illinois and Pennsylvania decisions
follow similar decisions in New York and Michigan.8 7
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF STATE INCOME
TAXATION OF TRUSTS

Decisions addressing the constitutionality of a state's power to
tax the income of an out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust have
principally referenced two provisions-the negative Commerce Clause
and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.8 8 The
jurisprudence with respect to each of these provisions is considered
below.

A. The Commerce Clause
If every state could tax income based on any contact with the
state, no matter how minimal, this "would have drastic consequences
for the national economy, as businesses could be subjected to severe
multiple taxation."8 9 As a federal constitutional matter, a state can be
barred
from
imposing
tax
that
would
interfere
with
commerce . . . among the several States .

..

0."
From these statements,

which situate the power to regulate interstate commerce affirmatively
in the federal government, the courts implied the dormant or negative
Commerce Clause. This implied constitutional limitation prevents a
state from discriminating in favor of in-state economic activity.9 1 This
is the case even when no affirmative federal regulation is present, as is

87.
For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part VI.
88. Occasionally, consideration is given to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See, e.g.,
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 53 (1920) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
protects a citizen from discriminatory taxes in a nonresident state but does not entitle that citizen
to tax immunity in that nonresident state). However, it has played a minimal role, especially if a
nonresident taxpayer is taxed within the state on source income and entitled to deductions
associated with the income taxed as would be residents.
89. Allied Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1992).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (negative Commerce Clause).
91.

See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 11.5 (5th ed. 2013) (noting the "negative implication" of the
Commerce Clause as restricting state laws that serve anti-competitive purposes by shifting costs
of local benefits to out-of-state persons).
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the case with state taxation of income. 92 The overriding concern is "to
avoid tendencies toward economic Balkanization . . . ."93
Importantly, the negative Commerce Clause has never been
applied to limit the authority of a state to tax its own residents'
worldwide income, 94 although the issue now is under consideration by
the Supreme Court. 95 The Commerce Clause "protects markets and
participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." 96 This can be especially
problematic for trusts. If a trust is resident in a state, that state will be
able to exercise taxing power over the trust, even with respect to income
sourced and taxed beyond its boundaries. 9 7 This is true despite the fact
that another state is also taxing the income. The trust would have to
show that " 'there is a risk of multiple taxation which places a burden
on interstate commerce that is not also borne by intrastate commerce.'
"98 In the case of a trust, the mere earning of income and realization of
gains in various jurisdictions, as opposed to engagement in business
activity, simply does not implicate the Commerce Clause.9 9

92.
See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1986):
[W]e have acknowledged the self-executing nature of the Commerce Clause and held on
countless occasions that, even in the absence of specific action taken by the Federal
Government to disapprove of state regulation implicating interstate or foreign
commerce, state regulation that is contrary to the constitutional principle of ensuring
that the conduct of individual states does not work to the detriment of the nation as a
whole, and thus ultimately to all of the states, may be invalid under the unexercised
Commerce Clause."
93.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
94. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989) ("It is not a purpose of the Commerce
Clause to protect state residents from their own state taxes.").
95.
See Md. State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 457 (Md. Ct. App.
2013) (raising the issue of whether a state is barred under the dormant Commerce Clause from
taxing "pass-through" income generated by a Subchapter S corporation in other states), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (May 27, 2014) (No. 13-485). See supra note 29 and infra text
accompanying note 182.
96. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997).
97.
See Zunamon v. Zehnder, 719 N.E.2d 130, 137-38 (Ill App. Ct. 1999) (Commerce Clause
provides no bar on taxing a resident's income sourced in another state); see also Luther v. Comm'r,
588 N.W.2d 502, 511-12 (Minn. 1999) (holding that income from intangible assets in a nonresident
state may be taxed by resident state). In Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 695 N.E.2d 1125, 1130
(N.Y. 1998), the New York Appellate Division held that New York is not required to afford a credit
for tax imposed on a "resident," who was also a domiciliary of New Jersey and taxed there. The
court held that no Commerce Clause issue was involved since tax can be imposed constitutionally
based on presence in the state "without regard to any specific commercial or economic transaction
or activity." Id. Further, the negative Commerce Clause does not apply when the state is regulating
evenhandedly, with only incidental effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 1131-32; see also City of
New York v. State, 730 N.E.2d 920, 930-31 (N.Y. 2000) (tax only on out-of-state commuters is a
violation of negative Commerce Clause).
98. Zunamon, 719 N.E.2d at 138.
99. Id.
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Of course, a NING or other trust that has left a state in order to
avoid state income taxes will not be resident in a state that taxes it. The
more controversial question is whether the settlor's former or current
state of residence can tax. At no time has the Supreme Court addressed
the application of the Commerce Clause to the taxation of trusts.
Accordingly, the constitutional jurisprudence has developed entirely in
the state courts. 100 What little state court jurisprudence there is
appears to be in conflict.
The decisions have dealt with the situation in which the settlor
establishes an out-of-state trust and is then taxed by his or her home
state on the basis that he was domiciled in the state when the trust was
established or became irrevocable. The leading case cited in support of
the exercise of taxing jurisdiction in these circumstances is Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Gavin. 10 1 In that case, the out-of-state trustee,
Chase Manhattan Bank, argued that the taxation of the income of the
inter vivos trust violated the Commerce Clause. The trustee contended
that such taxation discouraged the retention of out-of-state trustees
because doing so could generate a second tax on the income in the state
of residence of the trustee, in addition to taxation by the settlor's
domicile at death, thereby unconstitutionally promoting in-state
trustees. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected this argument.
While agreeing "that there are such incentives and risks, we conclude
that they are too remote and speculative to constitute a dormant
commerce clause violation." 102
The holding of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Gavin was a rather conclusory one with respect to
the Commerce Clause. It really did not give careful consideration to the
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. In particular, because the trustee
did not raise the issue, the court failed to consider the requirements of

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 103 In Complete Auto, the U.S.
Supreme Court set forth a four-prong test to determine that a state tax
is not violative of the negative Commerce Clause: (1) the taxpayer has
a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) the tax is fairly
apportioned, (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and (4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided by

100. The federal courts have not had a role due to the Tax Injunction Act. See supra text
accompanying note 83.
101. 733 A.2d 782, 805 (Conn. 1999).
102. Id.; see also WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 20.09 (3d ed. 2012) (asserting that,
contrary to the position of the Connecticut Supreme Court, a serious dormant Commerce Clause
issue exists that needs to be addressed by the Supreme Court).
103. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).

1972

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:6:1947

the state. 104 The Supreme Court proceeded in Quill Corporation v.
North Dakota105 to hold that in order to satisfy the first of these
requirements, the taxpayer had to have a physical presence in the state.
Based on the principles set forth in Complete Auto, as amplified
in Quill, the decision in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin is severely
flawed. One need only consider the clear failure in Chase to satisfy the
first prong, as the trustee (the taxpayer) did not have an actual physical
presence in the state. Similarly, with regard to the second prong, the
tax was arguably not fairly apportioned. The Connecticut revenue
authorities imposed a tax on the entire income of the trust purely on
the basis of the residence of the sole beneficiary, despite the nonresidence of the trustee and the fact that no assets producing income
were situated in Connecticut. As for the third and fourth prongs, their
application to this trust is far from clear but still deserving of
analysis. 106 Rather than using the four-prong test, the Connecticut
Supreme Court preferred to emphasize that many factors would enter
into the settlor's decision when choosing a trustee, urging that this
established the Connecticut law was not driving settlors away from
nonresident trustees, which would interfere with interstate commerce.
At the other extreme, the dissent emphasized that "the risk, and not
only the actuality, of multiple state taxation suffices to establish such a
constitutional violation [under the Commerce Clause]." 107
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, notwithstanding its flawed
Commerce Clause analysis, has stood as the principal authority on the
issue. Most recently, however, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, the statewide court of appeals, held that a similar
statute, in fact, did violate the Commerce Clause. 10 8 Complete Auto and

104. Id.
105. 504 U.S. 298, 317-19 (1992).
106. Indeed, even in a more recent decision by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,
Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust ex rel. McNeilv. Commonwealth, 67 A.3d 185, 192-198 (Pa. Commonw.
Ct. 2013), that did consider the prongs, the third prong was not discussed at all. See infra note
115.
107. Chase ManhattanBank, 733 A.2d at 808 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (citing Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261-62 (1989)); BORRIS BITTKER, REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE §8.07, at 8-23 (1999); 1 J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION

408[i][a], at 4-39 (3d ed. 1998). In fact, multiple state taxation per se is not a violation of the
negative Commerce Clause and the authorities cited do not so hold. Rather, they express the
principle that each state should only tax its fair share of interstate commerce. The real
controversies are what is a "fair share" and how should it be determined.
108. See Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust, 67 A.3d at 198 (finding imposition of Pennsylvania
income tax to all income from out-of-state inter vivos trusts unconstitutional). This statute, 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301(s)(2) (West 2014), has not yet been repealed, and there is no indication
in the codification that the provision has been held unconstitutional as applied.
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the foundation for the Pennsylvania court's holding in

Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust ex rel. McNeil v. Commonwealth.109
The Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust decision involved a number of
inter vivos nongrantor trusts administered out of state by nonresident
trustees. 110 All records were kept out of state. The trusts were governed
by Delaware law and earned no income from Pennsylvania sources.
While the beneficiaries were residents of the state, Pennsylvania
nevertheless sought to tax on the statutory basis that the settlor had
been a resident of Pennsylvania when he created the trusts.1 11 The
Commonwealth Court held the law unconstitutional, exclusively on
negative Commerce Clause grounds.
In reaching its decision, the court focused on the Quill physicalpresence add-on to the first requirement of Complete Auto. It concluded
that the requisite physical presence did not exist. Neither the residence
of the settlor at the creation of the trust nor the residence of the
beneficiaries in the taxable year satisfied the requirement. The
discretionary beneficiaries of the trust were likened to the North
Dakota customers in Quill who were purchasing products by mail from
a company outside the state. The Commonwealth Court made clear that
the focus must be on the trust itself.112 Moreover, unlike Chase

Manhattan v. Gavin, the beneficiaries in Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust
were all discretionary and might never have received anything. The
trustee was not obligated to ever make a distribution to any of them,
although distributions had been made to one beneficiary. The court held
that the settlor's residence in Pennsylvania forty-eight years prior to
the taxable year was the type of "slightest presence" rejected as
insufficient by the Supreme Court in Quill.11 3
The Commonwealth Court's decision is both sweeping in its
significance and precise in its reasoning. It stands in stark contrast to
the conclusory language of Chase ManhattanBank v. Gavin.114 On the

109. See Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust, 67 A.3d at 192-93 (summarizing Complete Auto's fourpart test for determining whether a state tax withstands scrutiny under the Commerce Clause
and Quill's articulation of the "substantial nexus prong" of that test).
110. See id. at 188.
111. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(5)(2); Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust, 67 A.3d at 189:
"The Board [of Finance and Revenue] ... held that, pursuant to [72 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7301(5)(2)] (defining resident trusts) and [72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(a)] (indicating
that all resident trusts are subject to a tax) . . . the Trusts were resident trusts because
Settlor was a Pennsylvania resident when he created the Trusts and, as such, are
subject to [Pennsylvania Income Tax]."

112. See Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust, 67 A.3d at 194.
113. Id. at 195.
114. The court opinion notes that in Chase ManhattanBank u. Gavin, the four requirements
set forth in Complete Auto were not considered. Id. at 193.
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other hand, the opinion is not necessarily a wholesale rejection of the
Pennsylvania statute and similar statutes elsewhere. In particular, the
holding is ambiguous as to whether a different result might have been
arrived at if one or more resident beneficiaries had not been
discretionary beneficiaries, but had held vested interests. Indeed, it
iterates and reiterates that not only were the beneficiaries all
discretionary beneficiaries, but that they had no right to a vested
remainder.
As for the other three requirements set forth in Complete Auto,
the Commonwealth Court found that requirement (2) was also not
satisfied. The attempt to tax the trust's entire income did not comport
with the minimal contact with the state that the trust had. As for
requirement (4),115 the court held again that the trust had not received
benefits and protections from the state and, thus, that the tax was not
"fairly related." While there were discretionary beneficiaries resident in
the state, any benefits they had received from the state were not
relevant. They were not the taxpayer-the trust itself was.
"[I]mportantly, as discretionary beneficiaries, they have no present or
future right to distributions from the trusts." 116 The settlor was also not
receiving benefits, as he was actually deceased in the taxable year. 117
There would seem to be two open questions as a result of the
Commonwealth Court's opinion. First, will any sort of future, but
vested, interest of a beneficiary resident in the state during the current
tax year allow for taxation of the entire income of the trust, compatible
with the negative Commerce Clause? While this question is discussed
later in this Article, 118 suffice to say that the out-of-state nongrantor
accumulation trust is designed exclusively with discretionary interests.
As long as a vested remainder is not held by a current resident, the
trust is free of tax under Robert L. McNeil, Jr.Trust. A cautious planner
will not provoke the unsettled constitutional question as to the impact
of a remainder vested in a resident of the state.
The second question is whether a tax on the entire income of the
trust can be assessed if the settlor continues to reside in the state or
has only recently departed. The court emphasized in its opinion that
the settlor had been gone from the state for forty-eight years prior to
the tax year-thus, he had "the slightest presence." But what if the
115. The court's analysis bypasses requirement (3), as the trusts did not contend that
requirement (3) was not satisfied. Id. at 192.
116. Id. at 198.
117. Because its decision was based exclusively on negative Commerce Clause grounds, the
court did not address federal due process and equal protection arguments or the argument that
the tax violated the uniformity clause of the state constitution. Id. at 198 n. 17.
118. See infra text accompanying note 134.
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settlor had not left, as would be true of many settlors relying upon a tax
avoidance trust? There is simply no way, short of other judicial
opinions, to know the outcome in such a circumstance or one where, for
example, the settlor remained in the state for years after the trust was
created or has been out of state only a few years when the state imposes
a tax. While language in the opinion indicates that the residence of the
settlor is irrelevant, the other language referenced above suggests that
the "presence" test is a continuum, which could possibly be satisfied
when fewer years have transpired.
The bottom line is that negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, as it relates to out-of-state trusts, is thin. The two major
decisions can be harmonized, but only when the settlor has long since
departed the taxing state and there are no vested beneficiaries resident
in the current taxable year.

B. The Due Process Clause
1. The Quill Approach
As noted, in addition to the Commerce Clause limitation on a
state's ability to impose taxes, including income taxes, the states are
restricted by another federal constitutional provision, the Due Process
Clause.1 19 The relevance of this clause in matters of taxation was
addressed in Quill. 120 In Quill, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that
the function of the Due Process Clause, in contrast to the Commerce
Clause, is to assure fairness through " 'notice' or 'fair warning.' "121 A
state's tax does not violate the Due Process Clause when a taxpayer
should have safely assumed that the state would exert authority over
it.
In Quill, a company had deluged the state of North Dakota with
sales catalogues, so that, according to the Supreme Court, it should
have expected the state to impose sales or use tax on its in-state
customers, requiring Quill to collect that tax. This was the case even
though the company had no physical presence in the state and, on that
basis, could not be taxed under the negative Commerce Clause. Left
unanswered, post-Quill, was how the Due Process Clause applies to
trusts-specifically, what contacts, past and present, should put the
trustee on notice about potential liability for taxation?

119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

120. 504 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1992).
121. Id. at 312.
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2. The Greenough Approach
Importantly, Quill departed from a body of decisions that had
applied the Due Process Clause to the state income taxation of trusts
from a different analytical perspective. The continuing authority of
such case law is now uncertain post-Quill. The reasoning of these
authorities may have been displaced by Quill. On the other hand, they
continue to be cited and may stand as a second, alternative branch of
due process analysis that survives as a complement to the Quill line of
analysis.

The leading pre-Quill decision is Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 1 22
an opinion that considered whether Rhode Island could impose an ad
valorem tax on intangible assets administered in a testamentary trust
established under a New York probate, where none of the trust
beneficiaries were domiciled or resided in Rhode Island and none of the
trust estate was situated in that state. Crucially, there was a Rhode
Island cotrustee, although all actions were taken by the New York
cotrustee.
Following the reasoning of an earlier decision regarding state
taxing power under the Due Process Clause, 1 2 3 the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that Rhode Island had no additional basis to tax.
Several key points stand out in the Court's opinion. First, unlike the
later Quill opinion, the Greenough opinion presented the due process
question in terms of whether the state affords any protections or
benefits for which it can seek taxes in return. Second, the Court made
clear that those protections and benefits need only be potential ones to
justify taxation. Thus, the Court stated that "although nothing
appeared as to any specific benefit or protection which the trustee has
actually received, [the Rhode Island Supreme Court] concluded that the
state was 'ready, willing and capable' of furnishing either 'if
requested.'" For example,
when testamentary trustees reside outside of the jurisdiction of the courts of the state of
the seat of the trust, third parties dealing with the trustee on trust matters or
beneficiaries may need to proceed directly against the trustee as an individual for matters
arising out of his relation to the trust. Or the resident trustee may need the benefit of the
Rhode Island law to enforce trust claims against a Rhode Island resident. As the trustee
is a citizen of Rhode Island, the federal courts would not be open to the trustee for such
causes of action where the federal jurisdiction depended upon diversity. The citizenship
of the trustee and not the seat of the trust or the residence of the beneficiary is the
controlling factor. The trustee is suable like any other obligor. There is no provision of the

122. 331 U.S. 486, 488-89 (1947).
123. See Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); Warren R. Calvert & Sylvia
Z. Gaspar, State Taxation ofAccumulated Trust Income: Statutory Approaches and Constitutional
Considerations,5 ST. & LOC. TAx LAW. 73, 76 (2000).
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federal Constitution which forbids suits in state courts against a resident trustee of a
trust created under the laws of a sister state. Consequently, we must conclude that Rhode
Island does offer benefit and protection through its law to the resident trustee as the
onwer [sic] of intangibles. 124

In the abstract, the due process standard set forth in Greenough
is more expansive than the Quill test of due process. But in terms of the
out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust, it is of little consequence.
True, the residence of a single trustee in the state suffices to justify
state taxation of the trust. 125 But this principle poses no obstacle to the
formation of the tax-free trust under discussion in this Article, since all
trustees would be from nontaxing states. 126
3. The Impact of the Testamentary Trust Decisions
Although this Article is concerned with federal constitutional
dimensions of taxing jurisdiction over certain inter vivos trusts, the
more extensive constitutional jurisprudence concerning testamentary
trusts needs to be considered. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not
addressed the matter, a number of state courts have done so. What has
emerged is a serious division of opinion. On the one hand, some courts
have found their own state laws unconstitutional. However, other
courts have found these contacts sufficient, from a constitutional
standpoint, to justify continued taxation as long as the trust is in
existence.
The first line of cases is represented by In re Swift.127 The
Missouri Supreme Court applied a multifactor balancing test in holding
that Missouri did not have jurisdiction to tax, notwithstanding the fact
that the testamentary trust was that of a Missouri decedent. Despite
the decedent's Missouri domicile, all other contacts deemed critical by
the court pointed elsewhere-the trustees, the situs of administration
124. Greenough, 331 U.S. at 495-96 (footnote omitted).
125. In Greenough, the tax was apportioned between resident and nonresident trustees. Id.
at 488. The Court also cited prior state decisions, all either permitting proportional taxation or no
tax at all. Id. at 497 n.27. No case was cited allowing the taxation of the entire income of the trust.
Under the law of California, jurisdiction to tax arises from the residence of a trustee in the state
during the tax year. See CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 17742 (West 2013). If there is more than one
trustee, the law apportions tax liability if there is a resident and nonresident trustee. Id. § 17743.
The income is apportioned based on the number of resident trustees, assuming that there are no
resident beneficiaries. See id. As for the computation when there are also some resident and some
nonresident beneficiaries, see CAL. FRANCHISE TAx BD., LEGAL RULING NO. 238 (Oct. 27, 1959).
See also CAL. FRANCHISE TAx BD., 2013 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 541, sched. G. (summarizing
relevant statutes and providing examples).
126. See supra Part IV. Greenough does make clear that its protections and benefits due
process analysis justifies state income taxation in certain circumstances, even if the result is
multiple state taxation. 331 U.S. at 496-97.
127. 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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of the trust estate, and the beneficiaries were all outside the state. In
light of the prevalence of these "foreign" factors, the balancing, in the
opinion of the court, weighed against taxation. This was the case even
though (1) there was a continuing probate administration, (2) without
such administration under Missouri law there would have been no
trust, (3) the statute very clearly provided for taxation, and (4) the U.S.
Supreme Court had not ever held the Missouri nexus for taxing to be
constitutionally infirm. Nevertheless, the Missouri Supreme Court
overturned the imposition of the tax on the ground that Missouri law
was "providing no present benefit or protection to the subject trusts,
their beneficiaries, trustees, or property."128
In contrast to In re Swift, the same Missouri Supreme Court did
hold that there was jurisdiction to tax in a later decision, Westfall v.
Directorof Revenue. 129 However, in this case a number of other elements
were present: some trust-owned real property had a situs in Missouri;
under certain contingencies set forth in the trust instrument, Missouri
charities could become beneficiaries; and under certain circumstances,
a Missouri bank could become a successor trustee.
Because of these elements, Westfall is distinguishable on factual
grounds from In re Swift and thus does not represent a repudiation of
In re Swift, but rather an indication of how Missouri's balancing test
can yield different outcomes. Moreover, other state courts have also
rejected on constitutional grounds the state's authority to tax a
testamentary trust simply because of the domicile or residence of the
decedent or settlor at the inception. 130 The argument that there is a lack
of continuing benefits and protections is especially compelling when the
state court's administration of a testamentary trust may be limited. For

128. Id. at 882. Without explanation, the court simply stated that certain other cases were
distinguishable. Id. at 882-83. One of these cases was First NationalBank v. Harvey, 16 A.2d 184
(Vt. 1940). In its opinion in that case, the Vermont Supreme Court had staked out the opposing
position, holding that the trust could not have come into existence without the approvalof the local
probate court and that such property remained within the jurisdiction of the probate court. Harvey,
16 A.2d at 189-90. It should be noted that this decision rests on the premise that there is always
continuing probate jurisdiction. See id. at 189. One way that Harvey may be distinguished is that
not all states today maintain continuing probate jurisdiction or necessarily assert it at all with
respect to some estates.
129. 812 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
130. See, e.g., Taylor v. State Tax Comm'n, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. Div. 1981) (explaining
that, although there was a New York cotrustee, it had no authority to act with respect to the
property situated in Florida). It is not entirely clear whether this was the critical consideration for
the court or whether its decision was based on the following broader conclusion: "The fact that the
former owner of the property in question died while being domiciled in New York, making the trust
a resident trust under New York tax law, is insufficient to establish a basis for jurisdiction." Id. at
649. It is also not clear whether Greenough would permit taxation based on partial ownership of
the assets by the cotrustee.
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example, the court's supervision under the law may be discretionary
and presumably exercised only at the behest of beneficiaries, creditors,
the trustee, and other interested parties. 131 Even if a tax return is filed
listing the trust's residence as the state seeking to tax, this is likely to
be regarded as a mere technical flaw, as is filing a "resident" tax
return. 132
Several courts have endorsed the contrary approach, upholding
the constitutionality of such a basis for state income taxation. For

example, in District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 33 a
testamentary trust of a District resident whose will had been probated
in the courts of the District of Columbia, was held to have a relationship
to the District distinct from the relationship, if any, between the
District and the trustee or trust assets. The District's unquestioned
power to resolve disputes over the trust, and to order accountings to
protect trust corpus and beneficiaries from potential malfeasance by the
trustee, represented the District's justifiable, though not necessarily
exclusive, jurisdiction over the trust itself. 134 The court rejected
contrary decisions by pointing out that they predated Quill. In reaching
its decision, the court refused to address the numerous decisions
holding otherwise, except to draw attention to some arguable conflicts
in the reasoning of Swift and Westfall. In particular, the court honed in
131. Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386, 398 (1983). Note that in Pennoyer, the
court did not require these additional elements to be present. Thus, it simply concluded that:
[C]reation of the trust in New Jersey and the resultant jurisdiction and availability of
the New Jersey courts to enforce or interpret this trust are insufficient contacts with
New Jersey to support the Director's income tax assessment. The creation of the trust
in 1971 through the probate process in New Jersey courts is an historical fact which,
absent continuing contacts, is not a constitutional nexus justifying income taxation of
undistributed income earned in 1979-80.
Id.; see also City of Augusta v. Kimball, 40 A. 666, 667-69 (Me. 1898) (rejecting the notion that the
court has authority over the assets once the estate has been closed and the assets distributed to
an out-of-state trustee). Similarly, in Bayfield County. v. Pishon, 156 N.W. 463, 463-64 (Wis. 1916),
the court also held that Wisconsin could not tax the income of a testamentary trust of a Wisconsin
testator once the property was in the hands of a nonresident trustee. However, this decision is
based on the Wisconsin statute then in force and should not be relied upon as an authority on the
constitutional issue.
132. See Bernstein v. Stiller, No. 09-659, 2013 WL 3305219, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2013)
("The declared residency of the trust assets is insufficient to give the Court personal jurisdiction
over Respondent Trustees.").
133. 689 A.2d 539, 544 (D.C. 1997).
134. Id.; see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782, 795-99 (Conn. 1999) (listing
state probate court's responsibilities related to trust); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Comm'r of
Revenue Sers., 716 A.2d 950, 957 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (emphasizing that:
In creating these testamentary trusts, the settlors exercised and took advantage of a
right or a privilege granted by Connecticut law. It is fair to say that the trusts owe their
existence to Connecticut law. Like the individual domiciliary or Connecticut
corporation, the resident trust may invoke the protection of Connecticut law and thus
be responsible to share the costs of government.)
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on Westfall's conclusion that the situs of only some trust property in
Missouri gave it jurisdiction to tax the entire income of the trust. This
would not be constitutionally permissible post-Quill. 135 Thus, the
Westfall court must have given weight to the additional factor that the
trust was created in Missouri.

The court in District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank
offered one other basis for taxing jurisdiction-a trust is a taxable
entity, like a corporation, which can be taxed where it is organized, even
if its operations are otherwise outside the state. 136 Like a corporation,
according to the court, a testamentary trust is a creature of the laws of
the state where created and owes its existence to those laws. In fact, the
case may be even stronger for the trust. Unlike a corporation, which can
reincorporate in another jurisdiction, a testamentary trust typically
cannot do so. 137

Most recently, in Residuary Trust A v. Director, Division of
Taxation,138 the New Jersey Tax Court rejected this line of pro-taxation
Due Process Clause cases. The Tax Court concluded that the law as set
forth in Potter v. Taxation Division Directo 139 should continue to be
observed and that there were simply two lines of cases in direct conflict
as to what the Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires in the
testamentary trust context. 140 The New Jersey Tax Court held that
Quill's Due Process holding in favor of taxation did not apply for two
reasons: first, Quill involved a use tax and, second, the taxpayer in Quill
135. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992), the Supreme Court, quoting
from Moorman Manufacturing.Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978), stated that the Due Process
Clause requires that "income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to
'values connected with the taxing State.' " In other words, global taxation based on a relatively
weak nexus with the state is not constitutionally permissible. Similar reasoning was applied in
Complete Auto and Quill with respect to the negative Commerce Clause. See Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (requiring that a tax be "applied to an activity with
a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State").
136. 689 A.2d at 544-45; see, e.g., Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks Cnty., 253 U.S. 325,
328 (1920) (with respect to taxation of a corporation). The equation of a testamentary trust to a
corporation as a justification for continuing taxation of a trust, though it has no connections with
the state after its creation, was endorsed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Gavin, 733 A.2d at
795 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has described a trust as something of an "
'abstraction' " that may be dealt with as an " 'entity' " (quoting Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331
U.S. 486, 493-94 (1947)). See also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Comm'r of Revenue Sers., 716 A.2d
at 957 (holding that, for tax purposes, a trust is a distinct entity and can continue to be taxed for
that reason alone).
137. Under current law this may actually be possible, such as by decanting. See JEFFREY A.
SCHOENBLUM, 2014 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO TRUSTS AND TRUST ADMINISTRATION tbl. 7 (2014) for

an in-depth state-by-state analysis of decanting statutes.
138. 27 N.J. Tax 68, 75-76 (2013).
139. 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983).
140. Residuary Trust A, 27 N.J. Tax at 75-76.
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was actively carrying on business, while the trust was simply a passive
owner of stock.14 1 Future decisions of higher courts will determine
whether these distinctions are sufficiently compelling. However, these
distinctions would appear to have little relevance regarding an inter
vivos trust, which is not a supervised trust, like the typical
testamentary trust, and is not ordinarily the product of a judicial
probate process at its inception.
4. The Due Process Clause and the "Forever Tainted Trust"
Jurisdiction Statutes

a. The Pre-QuillDecisions
The constitutional legitimacy of a statute authorizing continued
taxation of the investment income of a tax-avoidance trust when there
is no contact with the state other than the residence of the settlor at the
trust's creation or when it becomes irrevocable, a so-called "forever
tainted" statute, is extremely dubious. This is even true of a trust that
is funded by a will pour-over. For example, in Mercantile-Safe Deposit

& Trust Co. v. Murphy, 14 2 the New York Appellate Division held that
the state could not impose a tax on accumulated income of a trust, even
though assets had poured over from a New York estate to an inter vivos
trust pursuant to New York law, and the settlor and beneficiaries were
all New York domiciliaries. Instead, the court emphasized that the
trustee was a Maryland domiciliary and that the property was held and
administered in Maryland. 143
In Blue v. Department of Treasury,14 4 a later decision involving
a revocable trust that had become irrevocable upon the settlor's death,
the Michigan Court of Appeals also held that the state had no
jurisdiction to tax. The court emphasized as the crucial factors that
141. Id. at 75 n.11.
142. 242 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27-28 (App. Div. 1963), affd, 203 N.E.2d 490 (N.Y. 1964).
143. Id. at 28. But see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782, 802-805 (Conn. 1999)
(upholding constitutionality of taxation of inter vivos trust where the taxing state was the domicile
of the settlor at creation and the beneficiaries currently were residents of the state).
With respect to pour-overs from an estate to a trust established during the lifetime of the
settlor-testator, states have widely enacted the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act,
either the 1960 original version, enacted in 44 states, or the 1991 revision, incorporated as section
2-511(b) of the Uniform Probate Code. The 1991 version of the Act, section 1(b), provides that
unless the testator's will specifies otherwise, property devised to a trust established during the
testator's lifetime "is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator but it becomes part of the
trust to which it is devised." The 1960 version, section 1, states that the trust "shall not be deemed
to be held under a testamentary trust of the testator but shall become a part of the trust to which
it is given."

144. 462 N.W.2d 762, 763-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
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neither the trustee nor the trust property was in the state and
accordingly "conclude[d] that there [was] no ongoing protection or
benefit to the trust."14 5 The court found the purported benefits and
protections afforded by Michigan to the trust to be "hypothetical" and
"illusory," especially since the trust was registered and administered in
Florida.1 4 6 Under the facts, the only income that Michigan could tax
constitutionally was income derived from local assets.
A third significant decision is Potter v. Taxation Division
14 7
Director.
The New Jersey Tax Court held that there were insufficient
contacts to tax, both with respect to property added to an irrevocable
trust and also with respect to a pour-over from the estate of the settlor.
The court made some interesting points in support of its holding. It
stated that the required approval of the surrogate's court with respect
to the pour-over was inadequate to justify taxation, as was the fact that
the trustee participated in an informal settlement of account and a
release of the executrices during the subject year. The residence of
contingent beneficiaries in New Jersey was also deemed an insufficient
contact.
What remains uncertain from Potter is the court's statement
that:
[A]ny benefit to the trust from the laws of the State of New Jersey relative to the
distribution of assets from the estate to the trust can be accounted for in terms of the
inheritance tax paid to the State of New Jersey on the assets distributed and transferred
to the trust.

This statement could mean that, without such payment, an income tax
might be a legitimate alternative in light of benefits conferred. On the
other hand, the statement could simply mean that the mere prospect of
inheritance tax suffices, so that the income tax is not a valid substitute.
Or, most likely, the statement is dicta that is not relevant to the
question whether, from a constitutional perspective, there are sufficient
contacts to impose an income tax. In this regard, a fundamental
distinction is that the inheritance tax is based on a contact at the
moment of death. In contrast, no such contact exists in the case of the
income taxation of a nonresident trust when the tax is being imposed
many years after the year of the settlor's death or creation of the trust.
Indeed, as has already been noted,14 8 an inter vivos trust is not
under continuing supervision, as will be the case with many, if not all,
testamentary trusts. While every trust is organized under some state

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 764.
Id.
5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983).
See supra Part VI.B.3.
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law, the governing law set forth in the trust instrument will likely be
other than that of the settlor's domicile. The inter vivos trust generally
does not have to be registered, nor is it typically under the supervision
of a court, unless there is pending litigation. 149 While in some states
court approval would be necessary to depart the state, in the vast
majority of states no such approval would be required. 15 0
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, and as previously
discussed, 15 1 the
Connecticut
Supreme
Court upheld
the
constitutionality of a taxation scheme imposing tax on an inter vivos

irrevocable trust in Chase ManhattanBank v. Gavin. 152 A closer look at
the relevant statute153 in Connecticut, however, reveals a more complex
situation. The taxation of the trust, based on the residence of the settlor
when the trust became irrevocable, is further conditioned on the
presence in the tax year of a resident noncontingent beneficiary.
Moreover, if there are also nonresident, noncontingent beneficiaries,
then the income must be prorated and assigned based on the ratio of
Connecticut noncontingent beneficiaries to all noncontingent
beneficiaries.
Even under these circumstances, the Connecticut Supreme
Court acknowledged that "this is a closer case than with respect to
testamentary trusts."15 4 Nevertheless, in Gavin there was only one
beneficiary, a Connecticut noncontingent beneficiary for whom income
was being accumulated for eventual distribution to her. As she was
thereby enjoying all benefits and protections afforded by Connecticut,
"the state has given something for which it can ask return, and there is
a definite and sufficient link between the contact with the state and the
income sought to be taxed." 15 5 Though decided post-Quill, the court
likened the situation to Greenough, in which the United States
Supreme Court allowed Rhode Island to tax since one of the trustees
was resident in the state and the testator had died domiciled in Rhode
Island.

149. Similar distinctions between a testamentary and inter vivos trust were noted in dictum
in District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 547 n.11 (D.C. 1997). The
distinctions drawn suggest that the D.C. courts might actually hold the local statute
unconstitutional with respect to irrevocable inter vivos trusts. To date, however, no such case has
been decided.
150. See supra note 21.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
152. 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999).
153. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-701(a)(4) (West 2014).
154. Gavin, 733 A.2d at 801.
155. Id. at 802.
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This analogy, in fact, was specifically rejected in Greenough.156
Greenoughexplicitly distinguished cotrustees from cobeneficiaries, and,
in so doing, it cited to an earlier Supreme Court decision in Safe Deposit
& Trust v. Virginia.15 7 In Safe Deposit, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause an attempt by Accomac
County, Virginia, to impose a property tax on intangible assets
constituting the whole corpus of a trust administered by a Maryland
trustee. Equitable ownership of the assets of the trust was in Virginia,
where all the beneficiaries were domiciled.
The Court essentially offered two reasons for its holding. First,
it argued that the owner of legal title, the trustee, was resident in
Maryland and also had actual possession and control1 5 8 of the assets.
Second, to allow the domicile of the beneficiaries to tax the property
would lead to "double taxation, both unjust and oppressive."15 9
The Court in Safe Deposit recognized that Virginia could tax "the
fair value of any interest in the securities actually owned by one of her
resident citizens," citing Maguire v. Trefry. 160 Maguire had held that
Massachusetts could tax income received by a Massachusetts
beneficiary of a nonresident trust. Essentially, the income to which the
beneficiary has legal title is like the property in Safe Deposit.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Chase Manhattan v. Gavin,
questioned whether Safe Deposit is still good law in light of Curry v.
McCanless.16 1 Among other things, Curry rejected the argument that
taxation by more than one state of the same property or income was
constitutionally prohibited by the Due Process Clause. The Connecticut
Supreme Court also cited Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia,162 in which
the Supreme Court held that the state in which a beneficiary is resident
could tax income received from a nonresident trust, even though the
income had also been taxed by the state in which the trust was resident.
The reliance of the Connecticut Supreme Court on these cases
was misplaced. Safe Deposit is a property tax case. Chase Manhattan v.
Gavin is a trust income tax case. Supreme Court decisions like Maguire
156. 331 U.S. 486, 488-89 (1947). See supra text accompanying notes 122-24 for a more
extensive discussion of the case.
157. 331 U.S. at 496 (citing 280 U.S. 83 (1929)).
158. At the time, intangibles were often deemed situated where the evidences of title were
physically located. Today, intangibles involving passive investment assets are, with a few
exceptions, deemed to follow the domicile of the owner. See Crystal Commc'ns., Inc. v. Dep't of
Rev., TC 4769, 2008 WL 5182047, at *537-38.(Or. T.C. Dec. 10, 2008).
159. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, MD v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 93 (1929).
160. Id. at 92 (quoting 253 U.S. 12, 17 (1920)).
161. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782, 803 (Conn. 1999) (citing Curry v.
McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363 (1939)).
162. 305 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1938).
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and Guaranty, as well as Safe Deposit, recognize that a trust can be
taxed by its state of residence on its worldwide income, and that the
state of residence of a beneficiary can tax income received by the
beneficiary qua beneficiary. In each case, the tax is justified by the
benefit and protection received with regard to the property legally
owned. None of these decisions authorizes taxation of the nonresident
trust based on the residence of the beneficiary. This is important
because, in the case of an accumulation trust, the beneficiary has not
received anything. Thus, the state of the beneficiary's residence can
hardly afford protection and benefit to a property interest that may
never come to fruition. Arguably, the state could justifiably tax on the
basis of the beneficiary's equitable interest. 163 However, this is
practically and politically unfeasible, inasmuch as the beneficiary will
likely not have the cash resources to pay the tax or will have to dip into
other assets to satisfy the liability.
In sum, Chase Manhattan v. Gavin's due process analysis is,
indeed, flawed. Perhaps the vested, but undistributed, interest of the
sole beneficiary of a nonresident trust is close enough economically to
income actually received by a resident beneficiary so that, under the
unique facts of the case, the trust is taxable without violating the Due
Process Clause under pre-Quill constitutional analysis. Even if so, the
decision is not particularly persuasive regarding the out-of-state
nongrantor accumulation trust with its discretionary, contingent
beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries do not have interests comparable to
those of the noncontingent, vested beneficiary in Chase Manhattan

Bank v. Gavin.
b. The Illinois Court of Appeals Surrenders in Linn v. Department of
Revenue
The most recent decision on the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to a state's jurisdiction to tax an out-of-state trust has come in
Linn v. Department of Revenue, 164 a decision of the Illinois Court of
Appeals. It is an especially important decision because the facts in the
case involve a blatant attempt by a very wealthy family to re-situs
existing trusts in order to avoid Illinois income tax.

163. Safe Deposit, 280 U.S. at 95 (Stone, J., concurring). Some states, by statute, explicitly
declare that a beneficiary's discretionary interest is a mere expectancy and not an interest in
property. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-504 (2014).
164. 2 N.E.3d 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
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In Linn, the trustee of a Texas-administered inter vivos trust
established by members of the hugely wealthy Pritzker family165 sought
the return of an income tax payment made under protest. It argued that
any payment by the trust, identified as the "Autonomy Trust 3," was
"unconstitutional as the trust had no connections with Illinois." 166 The
circuit court had granted summary judgment to the Department of
Revenue. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals stated that, to comply with the Due Process
Clause, there must be a minimum connection "between the state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." 167 Second, quoting
Quill, "the income attributed to the state for tax purposes must be
rationally related to values connected with the taxing state." 168 The
court equated the due process analysis for taxation to that for personal
jurisdiction.
The Autonomy Trust 3 was described as a Texas trust governed
by the laws of and administered in Texas. In the taxable year at issue
(2006), the trustee, beneficiary, and trust protector 69 were all
nonresidents of Illinois. Nevertheless, the Department of Revenue
argued that (1) the trust owed its existence to Illinois and (2) the state
provided the trust and beneficiary "with a panopoly of legal benefits and
opportunities." 170 In so doing, it echoed the pre-Quill due process
analysis.

165. The original trust was established in 1961 by A. N. Pritzker, the patriarch of the family.
The family is known for founding Hyatt Hotels and the Marmon Group and claims several
billionaires. See, e.g., Laura Baverman, Billionaire Brothers Want More to Pritzker Name Than
Hyatt, UPSTART Bus. J. (Oct. 16, 2013), available at 2013 WLNR 26039913 (eleven members of the
Pritzker family made the 2013 Forbes'sWealthiest Americans list). One of the Pritzkers, Penny
Pritzker, is currently the United States Secretary of Commerce.
166. 2 N.E.3d, at 1208.
167. Id.
168. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (quotingMoorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair,
437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)).
169. A trust protector is a relatively new addition to the trust administrative structure. The
position is authorized by Uniform Trust Code section 808(c). See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt.
(amended 2010) ("Subsections (b)-(d) ratify the use of trust protectors and advisers."). Generally,
the trust protector may exercise oversight with respect to the actions of the trustee and may have
very broad powers, such as to amend or terminate the trust, or change the situs of trust
administration and the governing law. There are many outstanding legal issues regarding the
trust protector, as well as other trust advisers, who are also authorized by Uniform Trust Code
section 808. One such critical issue is whether they are fiduciaries. A second issue is whether the
trustee is bound to carry out their directions as to investments and distributions. The status of
these advisers and the duty of the trustee to obey can have a critical impact on the state's ability
to tax. See supra text accompanying note 169.
170. 2 N.E.3d, at 1210.
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In Linn, the court of appeals began its due process analysis by
distinguishing Chase Manhattan Bank v Gavin. 171 It read that case as
holding that the critical link between the state and the trust's
undistributed income "was the fact that the inter vivos trust's
noncontingent beneficiary was a Connecticut resident during the tax
year in question." 17 2 As such, "the eventual receipt and enjoyment of the
accumulated income were protected by Connecticut law so long as the
beneficiary remained a beneficiary of the state." 17 3
Linn emphasizes that the court's reasoning in Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Gavin regarding testamentary trusts is not pertinent. The
permanent ties of testamentary trusts do not exist in the case of inter
vivos trusts. Moreover, the Autonomy Trust 3 did not have a
noncontingent beneficiary in Illinois. Most critically, the court
explained: "Defendants cite no cases finding a grantor's in-state
residency is a sufficient connection for due process with an inter vivos
trust."17 4 In contrast, the court referenced Blue and Mercantile-Safe
Deposit Trust Company for the proposition that "the grantor's in-state
residence is insufficient to establish a minimum connection."1 75
With respect to Quill, the Linn court noted that the Autonomy
Trust 3 "had nothing in and sought nothing from Illinois."176 Then,
looking to the factors that would result in personal jurisdiction over the
trust in Illinois litigation, the court emphasized that none of these gave
jurisdiction under the facts of Linn: "the provisions of the trust
instrument, the residence of the trustees, the residence of its
beneficiaries, the location of the trust assets, and the location where the
business of the trust is to be conducted."17 7
Notwithstanding the foregoing, at first glance, one could read
the court's language in the Linn opinion as implying that the income
from assets pouring over from an estate can be subjected to taxation.
The court explained that the Autonomy Trust 3 was not in existence
when the settlor died and, thus, could not have been part of his probate
estate. 178 One could read this statement to suggest that the result might
be different with respect to income from property that pours over from
the estate to an inter vivos trust that is in existence.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999).
2 N.E.3d at 1209.
Id.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Kodsi, 836 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)).
Id. 1211.
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A more thoroughgoing analysis of the text of the opinion strongly
suggests that this is not the case. The trust in Linn was created by the
exercise of a limited power of appointment by the trustee in 2002. The
power had been created under the terms of a 1961 trust instrument.
The opinion emphasizes that, even assuming that an Illinois court had
validated the 1961 power, "what happened historically with the trust in
Illinois courts and under Illinois law has no bearing in the 2006 tax
year." 179 In short, the court of appeals seems to be saying that any state
contacts must be present in the relevant tax year.
Based on the foregoing, Linn stands as the culmination of a
series of cases that undermine the "forever tainted trust" statutes,
holding them unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause. While
several states continue to tax on this basis, these statutes will likely be,
and ought to be, overturned in the future upon federal constitutional
challenge.

C. Lingering ConstitutionalIssues
1. If Taxation of a Trust Hangs on Residence of a Beneficiary, How
Much Income Can Be Taxed?
This Article has already considered whether the residence of a
trust beneficiary is enough of a contact to justify taxing a trust where
the trustee is out of state, there are no trust assets in the state, and the
settlor is no longer domiciled or resident there. The jurisprudence
suggests that even if the settlor is still in state, there are not sufficient
contacts to justify state taxation of an out-of-state trust. 1so
If, however, the residence of a beneficiary is a constitutionally
sufficient contact to permit the settlor's home state to tax the income
from investment assets held by an out-of-state nongrantor
accumulation trust, precisely how much income constitutionally can be
taxed? There is no definitive answer to the question. At one level, the
reason for this is rather straightforward-there is no jurisprudence
addressing this very practical question. At another level, there can
never be a definitive answer-there is no objective, scientific metric.
Ultimately, some judge or judges will decide whether and to what
extent the presence of a resident beneficiary, noncontingent or
contingent, suffices to justify taxation of the trust income.
What can be said with some assurance is that a hundred percent
of the trust's income cannot be taxed if there are any nonresident

179. Id. at 1210.
180. See supra text accompanying note 174.
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beneficiaries. 181 Likewise, no court to date has been prepared to endorse
the imposition of tax on the basis that a beneficiary with a contingent,
discretionary interest is a resident of the state. As a result, the out-ofstate nongrantor accumulation trusts under consideration in this
Article almost certainly cannot, as a federal constitutional matter, be
taxed on account of a contingent, discretionary beneficiary's state of
residence. However, if the discretionary contingent beneficiaries do not
count as such and there is a vested remainderman, one hundred percent
of trust income may be subject to home-state taxation. Arguably, no
apportionment need occur in this circumstance.
More generally, one might argue that the very fact that the
settlor seeks to avoid all state taxation of income through use of the
trust should circumscribe consideration of Commerce Clause issues, at
a minimum. The fundamental concern from a Commerce Clause
standpoint is whether interstate commerce is being discouraged by the
state imposition. The principal question in the pending Supreme Court

case Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne1 82 is whether a state
or one of its subdivisions must credit income taxes paid to another state
based on source, or whether the home jurisdiction can tax one hundred
percent of the income based on the citizenship of the taxpayer. The
concern is double tax and not total avoidance of tax. On the other hand,
the criteria laid out in Complete Auto, refined in Quill, and applied to
an out-of-state trust in Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust strongly suggests
otherwise.
2. Can a Trust Be Taxed Based on the Application of
the Throwback Rule?
Suppose an out-of-state trust has accumulated income over
several years and then distributes the accumulated income as part of a
distribution of some or all of the trust estate to the resident beneficiary.
The beneficiary may seek to avoid the tax, first, on the ground that it
was the trust's income earned in the years when the trust was not
resident, and second, that what was distributed to the beneficiary is
principal under state trust accounting rules. Indeed, this was the claim
made in the famous California Supreme Court decision of McCulloch v.

FranchiseTax Board.183

In McCulloch, the beneficiary was, nevertheless, held liable for
the tax, apparently not individually on account of being a beneficiary,
181.
Auto test
182.
183.

See supra text accompanying note 104, pertaining to the second prong of the Complete
of constitutional validity under the Commerce Clause.
64 A.3d 453 (Md. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (No. 13-485).
390 P.2d 412, 415-17 (Cal. 1964).
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but rather on the basis of transferee liability.184 The enforcement of
transferee liability against a California beneficiary assures that
California will not lose out simply because the out-of-state trust itself
was not subject to tax during the years of accumulation and could not
be forced by the California revenue authorities to pay with the ease that
a resident beneficiary can be compelled to pay.
The court also held that standard accounting rules are not
controlling for income tax purposes. In the year of distribution, the
standard characterization as principal can be ignored and the
beneficiary's tax burden can be determined as if income tax had been
due as earned. This is essentially the same as the throwback rule
historically applied to domestic accumulation trusts under I.R.C. § 667,
prior to its repeal for distributions made in tax years beginning after
August 5, 1997.185 The federal throwback rule was repealed because

once the trust rates became more onerous than the individual rates,
trusts could no longer produce lower taxes. Accordingly, no need
remained for the complex throwback rules. The problem at the state
level of taxation is different. The concern is that a beneficiary will
receive income that is not taxed to the trust since it is not resident, and
not taxed to the beneficiary because it was not received or owned by the
beneficiary in the taxable year earned. 186
McCullough held that benefits and protections had been
afforded the resident beneficiary during the accumulation period and,
therefore, that the income could be taxed subsequently. But what
benefits and protections exactly did residence in California offer? Had

184. Id. at 420-21. Although the language of the opinion generally supports this conclusion,
the court apparently cited the predecessor to Cal. Prob. Code § 17745(a) in rendering its decision.
That provision taxes the beneficiary directly. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1139.10 (repealed 1986)
Richard S. Kinyon et al., CaliforniaIncome Taxation of Trusts and Estates, 39 ACTEC L.J. 69, 79
n.35 (2013); see also Joseph W. Blackburn, Grantor Trusts, Throwback Rules, and Their
Application-orNot-by the States, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES, Aug. 2006, at 28-36.
185. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997); H.R. 2014, 105th
Cong.

§

507(b)(1) (1997); see also 2 BYRLE M. ABBIN, INCOME TAXATION OF FIDUCIARIES AND

BENEFICIARIES 9-79 (2008). The federal throwback rule was repealed because once the trust rates
became more onerous than the individual rates, trusts could no longer produce lower taxes.
Accordingly, the complex throwback rules were no longer needed. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
186. A state "throwback rule" is also implemented by about half the states in the case of crossborder sales with respect to "nowhere income." This untaxed income results from an
apportionment formula between the state from which sales are made and the state in which the
purchase is actually made. If the producing state does not take account of sales and the state in
which the sale occurred does not have sufficient nexus to tax, then the income can escape taxation.
The throwback rule in this context has a very different meaning than as applied to out-of-state
trusts and resident beneficiaries. It presumes that sales income was derived from the state of
origin of the product sold. See UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAx PURPOSES ACT §16(b)(2) (1957) (sales
are considered to be in-state when they are not taxable in the state of the purchaser).
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the beneficiary resided outside of California until the year of
distribution, the trust would still have earned the income. Remember,
the beneficiary is being taxed as a transferee, a proxy for the trust, to
facilitate California's collection of the tax.
If the beneficiary were being taxed qua beneficiary, the
beneficiary almost certainly could be taxed only on income received in
the current taxable year. After all, the beneficiary had no right to
income in prior years and the tax is imposed on income received or to
which the taxpayer is entitled during the year. 187
Moreover, the court's reasoning would appear to justify taxation
of beneficiaries who are not resident in the state in the year of
distribution. Suppose the beneficiary had been a resident of California
during all the accumulation years but left in the year of distribution,
never to return. Under the reasoning of McCulloch, the beneficiary
would be liable for the tax in light of the benefits and protections during
the accumulation years. The only issue would be collection.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, California only imposes tax liability on
the beneficiary if the beneficiary is a resident in the year of
distribution, 188 so the throwback rule would not, in fact, be applied, and
there would be no taxation, despite the benefits, on account of residence
enjoyed by the beneficiary during previous years of income
accumulation in California.1 89
With respect to the out-of-state trust being taxed through the
California beneficiary in McCulloch, the terms of the trust instrument
provided that the beneficiary's interest terminated if he did not survive
until age forty. In that circumstance, the distribution would go to his
heirs, each of whom also purportedly benefitted from a California
residence. But what if they had all resided out of state? The primary
beneficiary would have had a contingent interest that might never have
vested and the remaindermen would have had no connection with the
state. Certainly in each of the years when the income was earned and
accumulated, it could not have been known whether the beneficiary
would survive. The ephemeral contact with California in each of those
taxable years would be a highly dubious foundation for the exercise of
state taxing jurisdiction on both Commerce Clause and Due Process
grounds, as currently interpreted. Unless McCulloch is read narrowly,
it appears to go well beyond what other courts have subsequently
187. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 17041 imposes a tax on a resident's taxable income for the
"taxable year." CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(a)(1) (West 2013).
188. See id.
189. However, the beneficiary is presumed to have continued residence if the beneficiary left
the state within twelve months of the distribution and returned within twelve months of the
distribution. See id. § 17745(e).
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considered a constitutionally permissible exercise of taxing power with
respect to out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trusts.
Regardless of the merits of McCullough's due process analysis,
there is another problem with the decision and others resting on the
beneficiary's residence in the state. The decision in Robert L. McNeil,
Jr. Trust v. Commonwealtho90 has already been discussed in some
detail. 19 1 Importantly, the Commonwealth Court in that case held quite
explicitly that the presence of beneficiaries resident in the state is not
a sufficient basis to satisfy the first prong of the negative Commerce
Clause analysis-the substantial nexus/physical presence requirement.
Assuming the Supreme Court meant to impose this requirement when
it stated as much in Quill, McCulloch and the California throwback
system is constitutionally suspect-indeed, almost certainly
constitutionally invalid. Not only was McCulloch decided pre-Quill and
pre-Safe Auto, but the opinion failed to consider the negative Commerce
Clause altogether.
In this regard, one must draw a fundamental distinction
between a statute like California's and one that imposes a tax on the
beneficiary when the beneficiary receives certain current income. There
is nothing unconstitutional about the latter, because the beneficiary
must be a resident of the state and is being taxed on his ownership of
income. Indeed, every state with an income tax would tax such receipt
of trust income.
In taxing the beneficiary individually, very few states enforce a
throwback rule. The effect of the throwback rule is to capture tax on
income that was accumulated in trust and distributed in a year where
the current income is substantially less than the total distributed,
including income accumulated from prior years. Without the throwback
rule, those prior years forever escape taxation. New York has enacted a
throwback rule effective January 1, 2014.192 Modeled on the California
throwback rule, the New York law carefully excludes "the income
earned by such trust in a taxable year prior to when the beneficiary first
became a resident of the state" from adjusted gross income. 193 As
written, the New York law would appear to permit taxation through its
throwback rule on income earned by the trust in a year in which the
beneficiary was not resident in New York if subsequent to the year in
which the beneficiary "first" became a resident.
190. 67 A.3d 185 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
191. See supra text accompanying note 109.
192. N.Y. TAx LAW § 612(b)(40) (McKinney 2014).
193. Id. Most likely, a California beneficiary would only be taxed for the years in which
resident in California, but there is not any authority addressing the matter and the law is not
entirely clear. Cf. Kenyon supra note 184, at 189-90.
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problem
the
demonstrates
example
following
The
constitutionally with the New York rule. Assume the beneficiary is a
resident of New York in year one of income accumulation. The
beneficiary then becomes a resident of New Jersey in years two and
three. In year four, the beneficiary once again becomes a resident of
New York. In year five the distribution is made. The throwback rule
should only result in taxation of income attributable to years one and
four and not years two and three. However, the New York law, at least
on its face, is not so limited.
3. Is New York's Statutory Classification of Incomplete Gift
Nongrantor Trusts as Grantor Trusts Violative of
the U.S. Constitution?
Is New York's classification of a NING and other incomplete gift
nongrantor trusts as "grantor trusts" an unconstitutional exercise of its
taxing jurisdiction? One can make a strong argument that it is. To
understand why this is the case, one must revisit New York
jurisprudence with regard to the constitutionality of taxing "forever
tainted" trusts.1 94 In particular, in Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Murphy,19 the New York Appellate Division held that a state would
violate the Due Process Clause if it imposed a tax on the income of an
accumulation trust where the trustee was administering the trust from
beyond the confines of the state's boundaries and, at all times, the trust
assets were under its control out of state.
The decision required New York to amend its tax law. While
such trusts were still deemed "resident" trusts, an exemption from
income tax was introduced mirroring the Appellate Division's holding.
That exemption still appears in the statute. 196 Simply providing now
that a trust can be taxed because it will be treated as a grantor trust
does not eliminate the constitutional infirmity identified by the New
York Appellate Division. If the trust is being administered outside the
state and the trust assets are out of state, the trust that would have
been constitutionally exempt in 2013 must still be constitutionally
exempt in 2014. For that reason, only a judicial reversal of MercantileSafe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy would permit New York's recent
enactment to pass constitutional muster. But were that to occur, it
would put New York courts at odds with the more recent decisions in

194. See supra text accompanying notes 142 andl72.
195. 242 N.Y.S. 2d 26, 28 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 96 (N.Y. 1964).
196. See N.Y. TAx LAW § 605(b)(3)(D)(i) ("A resident trust is not subject to tax under this
article if all [stipulated] conditions are satisfied. . . .").

1994

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:6:1947

other states and would essentially acknowledge that the New York
courts had gotten federal constitutional law wrong for a half century.
One might argue that the court of appeals decision did not
consider at what point the settlor's strings of control become so
significant that the trust itself can be ignored and its income collapsed
into that of the settlor. The problem with this reasoning is that New
York has consistently followed the definition in the Internal Revenue
Code, and continues to do so. New York has now departed from the
venerable rules set forth in the Code and observed by every other state
that recognizes grantor trusts.
The fact that the income tax rules and gift tax rules at the
federal level are not in pari materia on the issue of ownership is entirely
coherent in view of the different purposes served by the taxes. While
one might be seduced by the argument that New York has a strong
interest in having consistent rules for its income tax and gift tax, the
problem is that New York has no gift tax.
The New York effort to outlaw incomplete gift nongrantor trusts
is purely an effort to staunch the loss of revenue resulting from the
movement of capital to other states. Not only would this appear to

violate Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy under the Due
Process Clause, but it also represents a very direct violation of the
negative Commerce Clause under the reasoning of Robert L. McNeil
Trust. Under that reasoning, the original residence in the state and the
presence of a beneficiary are not sufficient contacts for jurisdiction to
tax. More fundamentally, in many cases the application of the statute
may not result in a fair apportionment. 197
The argument might be made that the New York legislation is
simply attacking those seeking to avoid all state income taxes through
use of a NING-like vehicle. The problem is that the ultimate tax take of
all states is beside the point. The issue is whether the taxation comports
with the standards set forth in the Commerce Clause precedent.
Moreover, with respect to the Due Process Clause, Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy rejects the argument that the Due
Process Clause only applies in the double or multiple state taxation
context. The limitations on state taxing jurisdiction with respect to the
income taxation of trusts is not based on fairness to the states, but on
the limits placed on each state's power to tax individuals and entities
scattered throughout the United States.
197. See Robert L. McNeil, Jr. Trust ex rel. McNeil v. Commonwealth, 67 A.3d 185, 195-97
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (as trusts did not derive any income, benefits, or assets in Pennsylvania,
taxation was externally inconsistent, that is, there was not a fair apportionment of interstate
income so that Pennsylvania only taxed the portion attributable to intrastate activities); see also
the discussion of the case beginning supra text accompanying note 109.
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4. As a Constitutional Matter, Must One State Facilitate the
Enforcement of Another State's Judgment Pertaining to
State Income Tax?
Suppose one state, such as the state of residence of a beneficiary,
wishes to collect tax from an out-of-state trust. Assume that its highest
state court has held that nexus constitutional. Can it sue the trust in
the state in which it is being administered to collect the tax? By the
weight of authority, one state is not required, from a constitutional
standpoint, to enforce a claim for taxes in its courts in favor of the taxing
authorities of another state. 198 On the other hand, if the claim has been
reduced to a money judgment, it must be enforced under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution, which requires giving
credit to the judgments of the courts of other states even if those
judgments run against the local state's strong public policy. 199 In many
cases, however, enforcing the judgment will not be possible. As the

Supreme Court held in Baker v. GeneralMotors Corporation:
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other
States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.
Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects
do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law. 200

Essentially, the Supreme Court has made clear that, as a
constitutional matter, full faith and credit involves issue and claim

198. See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring), aff'd on
other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930) (refusing to express an opinion on the question); Philadelphia v.
Cohen, 184 N.E.2d 167, 169-70 (N.Y. 1962) (deferring to legislation dictating public policy rather
than weighing pros and cons); P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Right to MaintainAction or Proceeding
in One State or Country to Collect or Enforce Tax Due to Another State or Country or Political
Subdivision Thereof 165 A.L.R. 796, Il.a. (1946) ("The view that an action or proceeding may be
maintained in the courts of one sovereignty to recover taxes due to another sovereignty has
received scant support from the courts."). But see Okla. ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 282
S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ark. 1955) ("In our opinion the oft-repeated dogma, that one sovereign does not
enforce the revenue laws of another, is rapidly approaching a deserved extinction in those
instances in which the dispute is not international but merely interstate."). In Milwaukee County
v. ME. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935), the Supreme Court called it "an open question." The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 89 cmt. b (1971) decided to express no opinion on the
issue, noting that the courts are divided.
199. See Milwaukee Cnty., 296 U.S. at 277, 279 ("[Full faith and credit] ought not lightly be
set aside out of deference to a local policy. . . . [N]o state can be said to have a legitimate policy
against payment of its neighbor's taxes, the obligation of which has been judicially established by
courts. . . .").
200. 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1999) (citing McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 325
(1839) (holding that judgment may be enforced only as "laws [of enforcing forum] may permit"));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (1971) ('The local law of the forum determines
the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced.").

1996

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:6:1947

preclusion, that is, res adjudicata, 2 01 and not the obligation of the
executive officials of one state to enforce a judgment in the manner
prescribed by the out-of-state judgment itself. Moreover, if a state is
required to afford full faith and credit and the other party-the taxing
state-believes the judgment is not being enforced, its only remedy is
to seek relief from the United States Supreme Court. 202
As a statutory matter, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, which governs enforcement of sister state judgments
and has been adopted by more than half of the states, does not have an
exception for tax warrants and judgments. Thus, it is possible for a state
to seek enforcement of a tax-related judgment, for example, where the
trustee or the trust assets are. While there does not appear to be a
definitive opinion on the Act's application to the out-of-state trust
setting, the principle has been recognized in other settings. 203 Still,
procedural impediments may hamper actual collection on a judgment
involving a tax claim.
In sum, the matter is rather complex and the outcome
unpredictable. A state can slow-walk enforcement by seeking to confirm
that all jurisdictional requirements were satisfied before the judgment
was issued. It may also raise statute of limitations issues on the ground
that this is a matter of local procedure and enforcement. 204 As a
consequence of this procedural autonomy, even if state tax authorities
can obtain a judgment that is otherwise constitutionally valid,
enforcement of such judgment will be uncertain. No doubt, this will
encourage acceptance by the taxing authorities of a deeply discounted
settlement of the judgment or even a decision not to expend limited
resources by seeking enforcement of it in the first place. This
contributes further to the appeal of the out-of-state nongrantor

201. As a result, the judgment will not be enforceable if the preconditions to claim preclusion,
including personal jurisdiction, have not been satisfied.
202. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 155-56 (5th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he Court has expressly
indicated that the only remedy available for violations of full faith and credit is review by the
Supreme Court.").
203. See, e.g., N.Y. State Comm'r of Taxation & Fin. v. Friona, 902 So.2d 864, 866-87 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that statute of limitations had not run to bar New York state's
domestication of foreign judgment).
204. See, e.g., Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 190-91 (1966) (per curiam) (affirming
judgment for defendant as state statute of limitation for plaintiffs foreign judgment tolled); Grazer
v. Jones, 294 P.3d 184, 197 (Idaho 2013) (affirming summary judgment for defendant as plaintiffs
foreign judgment lien had expired). As the discussion in these cases indicate, even the authority
to rely on local procedural law is in dispute. Courts are also divided on the question whether the
forum's statute of limitations is applicable when the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act applies. Compare Wright v. Trust Co. Bank, 466 S.E.2d 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (forum's statute
of limitations not applicable), with Fairbanks v. Large, 957 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997)
(applicable).
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accumulation trust for taxpayers and their estate planners. Once again,
federal constitutional law contributes to private wealth transfer by
curbing state power to enforce its tax judgments.
VII. CONCLUSION

The theme of this symposium is the role of federal law in private
wealth transfer. One surprising and invariably neglected area in which
federal law plays a huge role is state income taxation of trusts.
Specifically, the interpretation of the Federal Commerce and Due
Process Clauses has facilitated an extraordinary stratagem by which
wealthy individuals are able to avoid all state income taxes on
investment income through the use of a carefully crafted out-of-state
trust. More strikingly, this interpretation and application of federal
constitutional law has come from diverse state courts.
Admittedly, the constitutional jurisprudence as applied to trusts
is sparse. Yet certain reasonably safe conclusions can be drawn. A state
can tax the worldwide investment income of a trust that is being
administered from the state. A state can also tax the income of an outof-state trust that is sourced to the state, as in the case of net profits
from a business conducted by the trust in the state. The same would be
true of rental income derived from real or tangible personal property
located in the state.
On the other hand, the Federal Constitution, at least as most
recently interpreted, does not seem especially tolerant of taxation based
solely on settlor's tax residence at the time of creation of the trust or
when the trust became irrevocable. It also seems to bar a state from
taxing an inter vivos, out-of-state nongrantor accumulation trust on the
basis of residence of a beneficiary, at least with respect to a trust that
has exclusively discretionary, contingent beneficiaries, even if those
beneficiaries are locally resident. A state may seek to tax the receipt by
a resident trust beneficiary of distributed income from an out-of-state
trust. There is strong constitutional authority for such taxation, even
if, as a result, there is double taxation. However, for reasons discussed
in this Article, taxing a trust based on the residence of the beneficiary
is, and ought to be, of dubious constitutional validity, at least under the
Commerce Clause.
By paying careful attention to the nuances of federal
constitutional jurisprudence, some very savvy planners are crafting
trusts and situating them in state tax havens so as to eliminate all
state-level income taxes on investment income. Even when a trust is
created for the obvious purpose of tax avoidance, courts apply federal
constitutional principles on the basis of federalism-structural and
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liberty-fairness concerns, rather than on the basis of tax policy. That
treatment has created an enormously rich opportunity to enhance the
accumulation and eventual transmission of private wealth through the
use of a specialized trust, the NING, or by changing the situs of certain
preexisting irrevocable trusts.

